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REGTECH AND PREDICTIVE LAWMAKING:
CLOSING THE REGLAG BETWEEN 
PROSPECTIVE REGULATED ACTIVITY AND 
REGULATION 
John W. Bagby∗ & Nizan G. Packin†
ABSTRACT
Regulation chronically suffers significant delay starting at the detectable 
initiation of a “regulable activity” and culminating at effective regulatory 
response. Regulator reaction is impeded by various obstacles: (i) confusion in 
optimal level, form and choice of regulatory agency, (ii) political resistance to 
creating new regulatory agencies, (iii) lack of statutory authorization to 
address particular novel problems, (iv) jurisdictional competition among 
regulators, (v) Congressional disinclination to regulate given political 
conditions, and (vi) a lack of expertise, both substantive and procedural, to 
deploy successful counter-measures. Delay is rooted in several stubborn 
institutions, including libertarian ideals permeating both the U.S. legal system 
and the polity, constitutional constraints on exercise of governmental powers, 
chronic resource constraints including underfunding, and agency technical 
incapacities. Therefore, regulatory prospecting to identify regulable activity 
often lags the suspicion of future regulable activity or its first discernable 
appearance. This Article develops the regulatory lag theory (RegLag), argues 
that regulatory technologies (RegTech), including those from the blockchain 
technology space, can help narrow the RegLag gap, and proposes programs to 
improve regulatory agency clairvoyance to more aggressively adapt to 
changing regulable activities, such as by using promising anticipatory 
approaches.
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† Associate Professor of Law, Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City Universi-
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INTRODUCTION
“Regulable activities” present a durable, and to some extent an irreconcila-
ble political conundrum. How do we determine which activities individuals, 
firms, and regulators should either not engage in, or engage in differently?
“Wrongs” is the simple, traditional answer, but often rings hallow to libertari-
ans, many of whom have varying definitions of what that might mean. Political 
economists criticize, and sometimes defend, third party effects—particularly 
negative externalities.1 However, perhaps more pragmatically defined here, 
regulable activities arise from actions that spark public outrage, academic criti-
cism, concerted political responses, judicial censure, and utopian propositions.
Generally speaking, lawmakers around the globe have adopted a similar range 
of regulatory strategies to deal with regulable activities. Such strategies include 
banning certain activities; regulatory passivity; passing new legislation or grant-
ing permission on a case-by-case basis; and adopting a more interactive ap-
proach between private sector players and regulators, like the implementation of 
innovation offices, accelerators, and sandboxes.2
But, regulators world-wide are often hamstrung in defining regulable activi-
ty by one or more of the following: (i) strict constructionism;3 (ii) opacity;4 (iii) 
narrowly defined wrongs too often resulting from political compromise;5 (iv) 
wrongdoer stealth;6 and/or (v) limited investigatory and enforcement budgets or 
1. See, e.g., Hal R. Varian, A Solution to the Problem of Externalities When Agents Are 
Well-Informed, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 1278 1994) (discussing third party costs).
2. See generally AURELIO GURREA-MARTÍNEZ & NYDIA REMOLINA, GLOBAL 
CHALLENGES AND REGULATORY STRATEGIES TO FINTECH (2020).
3. Politicians that want judges to exercise “judicial restraint” or avoid “judicial activism,”
also support—as President Nixon referred to in his famous terminology—a judicial philosophy of 
“strict constructionism.” See Bryan H. Wildenthal, Judicial Philosophies in Collision: Justice 
Blackmun, Garcia, and the Tenth Amendment, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 749, 750 (1990) (explaining that 
strict constructionism implies “obedience to the plain words of the Constitution itself. According to 
this philosophy, judges should adhere to the precise language of the Constitution, and only strike 
down laws which clearly violate a specific constitutional provision.”).
4. In recent years, many have discussed the opacity problem in the context of algorithms. 
See, e.g., Ignacio N. Cofone, Algorithmic Discrimination Is an Information Problem, 70 HASTINGS 
L. J. 1389, 1437 (2019) (“Opacity introduces a regulatory problem not only because decision-
subjects may have a right to an explanation, but also because it makes it more difficult to create an 
environment that reduces the existence of biases, and it limits the application of doctrines such as 
disparate impact. It is difficult, in other words, to correct a decision-making process that we cannot 
access or understand.”).
5. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Narrow Banking: An Overdue Reform That Could 
Solve the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem and Align Us and Uk Financial Regulation of Financial Con-
glomerates (Part 1), BANKING & FIN. SERVICESSERV, REP.1, 16–17 (2012) (“large financial institu-
tions continued their aggressive lobbying campaign to weaken the Volcker rule during the confer-
ence committee’s deliberations on the final terms of Dodd-Frank. The conference committee ac-
accepted a last-minute compromise that significantly weakened the Volcker.”).
6. See, e.g., 2 JAMES T. O’REILLY, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. § 29:34 (Katharine A. Van Tes-
sel ed., 2d ed. 2020) (discussing stealth regulatory scheme and how wrongdoers might try to take 
130 Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review [Vol. 10:127
agency expertise.7 This situation is precisely the limit sought by many libertari-
ans; to whom liberty is enhanced by effectively limiting government power to 
address societal needs without first expending great cost from limited resources. 
It almost guarantees that regulatory responses will lag nearly any initial percep-
tion of perceived wrongs. Activities susceptible to eventual, broad perception 
of wrongfulness are arguably regulable. This Article focuses on a Regulatory 
Lag (RegLag) theory, which is somewhat similar to the “Law Lag” concept dis-
cussed in recent law and technology literature—connected with attempts to reg-
ulate new technology-driven products and services—but more inclusive.8
RegLag is not ideal, which is why, in recent years, administrative law ex-
perts have focused on ways for lawmakers to be able to quickly and effectively 
make novel legal and policy changes when needed. One example is the use of 
guidance documents, but that practice has long been controversial and consid-
ered one of the most challenging aspects of administrative law.9 Likewise, an-
other way could be via actions that government and regulatory agencies take in 
advantage of certain situations or laws to give all sorts of different impressions to consumers, such 
as “We are FDA regulated” that may be interpreted by consumer to mean “We are safe.”).
7. Likewise, because of limited enforcement and investigatory budgets, regulators are re-
quired to make difficult decisions regarding how and who to pursue when enforcing the law. See, 
e.g., Futernick v. Sumpter Township, 78 F.3d 1051, 1058 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 928 
(1996); In re B & R Oil Co., 8 E.A.D. 39, 52–53 (EAB 1998).
8. “Law lag” or “legal lag” are phrases that have been used in law and technology literature 
in connection with situations in which “existing legal provisions are inadequate to deal with a so-
cial, cultural or commercial context created by rapid advances in information and communication 
technology.” Jeremy Pitt & Ada Diaconescu, The Algorithmic Governance of Common-Pool Re-
sources, in FROM BITCOIN TO BURNING MAN AND BEYOND: THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY AND 
AUTONOMY IN A DIGITAL SOCIETY 130, 137–38 (John H. Clippinger & David Bollier eds., 2014); 
see Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger 
Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191, 202 (2016) (explaining law lag 
in the context of distributed ledger technology and its regulation); see Thomas R. McLean, The Off-
shoring of American Medicine: Scope, Economic Issues and Legal Liabilities, 14 ANNALS HEALTH 
L. 205, 254 (2005) (discussing things that tend to limit the legal lag time associated with telemedi-
cine technology and usages); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Cybertorts and Legal Lag: 
An Empirical Analysis, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 77 (2003) (showcasing how Richard Nixon, in 
1936, reflected on how within one generation, automobile liability law became so developed that 
the size of a comprehensive review grew from a few-page document to an entire encyclopedia); 
Michael L. Rustad & Maria Vittoria Onufrio, The Exportability of the Principles of Software: Lost 
in Translation, 2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 25, 29 (2010) (demonstrating how “[i]n the case of 
software law, there has been a forty-year ‘legal lag’ between the rises of software as a separate in-
dustry and the development of specialized contracting principles.”). In this Article we focus on 
“RegLag,” which is similar to “law lag,” or “legal lag,” but broader as it does not specifically refer 
to circumstances in which the lag results from technologically-driven changes, but generally to situ-
ations in which new regulation is needed to address new types of “wrongs” or new should-be-
regulable types of activities. “Law lag” or “legal lag” in that sense, are terms that closely follow the 
understanding that “[l]aw lags science; it does not lead it.” Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 
319 (7th Cir. 1996).
9. See, e.g., Ming Hsu Chen, How Much Procedure Is Needed for Agencies to Change 
“Novel” Regulatory Policies?, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 1127 (2020) (explaining that when a government 
agency uses a guidance document to change or make policy, it need not provide notice to the public 
or enable comment on the new rule; this makes legal and policy changes easier and faster).
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investigations and enforcement proceedings.10  These methods are part of what 
has become known as administrative constitutionalism legal scholarship—a 
catchphrase for literature that explores the role of administrative agencies in in-
fluencing, creating, and establishing constitutional standards and norms, and 
governing based on those.11  This Article has some overlap with administrative 
constitutionalism scholarship advocating for a different way to handle RegLag: 
by using Regulatory Technology (RegTech), including those from the block-
chain technology space, to reduce RegLag by modifying the types of regulable 
activities, and by using technology-enabled anticipatory approaches (“Anticipa-
tory RegTech Model”). 
This Article’s proposal of using RegTech to help narrow RegLag gaps uses 
analogies and borrows insights from theories of ‘adaptive law’ and resilience-
and-law.12  Indeed, studying how environmental law should be constantly 
changing to increase its adaptive capacity to faster and better regulate evolving 
life circumstances is useful, and we advocate for harnessing the power of Reg-
Tech to improve this adapting process.  An adaptive law system is one that “fa-
cilitates social and ecological resilience through moderate evolution in rules, 
standards, processes, and structures as the system adapts to changing condi-
tions.”13  Resilience-and-law scholars give importance to adaptive manage-
ment.14  Adaptive management is an iterative management process that assumes 
knowledge relies experimentation: with feedback loops, monitoring, learning, 
and changes based on what is learned in real-time, constantly updating predic-
 
 10. Suspecting that President Trump is attempting to limit in many ways the actions that 
agencies can take in investigations and enforcement proceedings, on January 30, 2020, the OMB 
published a Notice entitled “Comments of Richard J. Pierce, Jr. on Promoting the Rule of Law 
Through Transparency and Fairness in Civil Administrative Enforcement and Adjudication.” In the 
Notice the OMB solicited comments on the issues of fairness of the adjudication procedures that 
agencies use in enforcement proceedings. See RICHARD J. PIERCE Jr., COMMENTS OF RICHARD J. 
PIERCE, JR. ON PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW THROUGH TRANSPARENCY AND FAIRNESS IN CIVIL 
ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT AND ADJUDICATION 1 (2020). 
 11. See David E. Bernstein, “Administrative Constitutionalism:” Considering the Role of 
Agency Decisionmaking in American Constitutional Development (forthcoming 2020). 
 12. Other scholars have also argued that environmental justice scholarship helps to address 
gaps in legal literature relating to adaptation law and resilience. See, e.g., Joseph Wenta, Jan 
McDonald & Jeffrey S. McGee, Enhancing Resilience and Justice in Climate Adaptation Laws, 8 
TRANSNATL. ENVIRON. L. 89 (2019). 
 13. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Resilient Cities and Adaptive Law, 50 IDAHO L. REV. 
245, 253 (2014). 
 14. Id. See also Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change’ Manag-
ing Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 16–24 (2009); Robin Kundis 
Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 
16–26 (2014).); Robert L. Glicksman, Ecosystem Resilience to Disruptions Linked to Global Cli-
mate Change’ An Adaptive Approach to Federal Land Management, 87 NEB. L. REV. 833, 865-91 
(2009); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory Penalty Defaults: 
Toward a Bounded Pragmatism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 946–56 (2003). 
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tions of what is to come.15 Adaptive management is partially practiced by fed-
eral agencies that handle environmental matters, such as the managing of for-
ests, wetlands, and river systems,16 but this Article argues that all regulators 
could benefit from learning more about it and how to utilize RegTech to effec-
tively address trends and changing circumstances. For example, using RegTech 
to better manage, regulate, and shorten RegLag gaps has already proven effi-
cient in the context of smart cities—an area in which legal scholars have dis-
cussed the context of adaptive management and the importance of the presence 
of an adaptable legal system.17 Toward this goal, regulators that adopt surveil-
lance technology and rely on data collection for the allocation and management 
of resources do so to constantly try to predict future challenges and trends.18
There is no reason not to expand the use of RegTech to all lawmakers to 
help them adapt more aggressively to changing regulable activities by using 
promising anticipatory approaches. An emerging community of scholars, regu-
lators, service providers, consultants, and information technologists now under-
stand the advantages and power of RegTech.19 RegTech promises to address 
contemporary challenges confronting regulatory programs by achieving statuto-
ry missions while remaining politically responsive. RegTech is disruptive to 
previously stable legacy compliance approaches currently taken by regulatory 
agencies and regulated entities.20 Disruption is predictable for the primary leg-
acy regulatory methods used by regulatory agencies, including: (1) statutory 
mission interpretation, (2) agency workforce training and adaptation, (3) poli-
cymaking and rulemaking, (4) monitoring and maintenance of regulatory sys-
tems, (5) investigations, (6) sensor operations, (7) data collection, (8) enforce-
ment, (10) litigation and dispute resolution, (11) development and 
announcement of regulatory guidance, (12) oversight of self-regulatory organi-
zations (SROs), and (13) agency hiring and procurement.
15. See generally C.S. HOLLING ET AL., ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND 
MANAGEMENT (C.S. Holling ed., 1978).
16. See, e.g., Camacho, supra note 14, at 25–36.
17. See, e.g., Janine S. Hiller & Jordan M. Blanke, Smart Cities, Big Data, and the Resili-
ence of Privacy, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 324–25 (2017) (explaining how it has become clear that 
building resilient cities must include working on a constantly updating disaster response, economic 
planning for land use and urban growth, bridging physical and human communities, and much 
more).
18. Id. at 354.
19. See, e.g., Eva Micheler & Martyna Sucharzewska, Conference Report, Technology in 
Finance, Law and Regulation—Taking Stock, 38 LONDON SCH. ECON. L. POL’Y BRIEFING SERIES 2,
4 (2019).
20. See, e.g., RegTech Universe 20202021, DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/lu
/en/pages/technology/articles/regtech-companies-compliance.html; Regtech compliance disruption 
growing; spending will reach $115.9 billion, PAYMENTSNEXT, https://paymentsnext.com/regtech-
compliance-disruption-growing-spending-will-reach-115-9-billion/; Arun Suresh, RegTech: A new 
disruption in the financial services space, PWC INDIA, https://www.pwc.in/consulting/financial-
services/fintech/fintech-insights/regtech-a-new-disruption-in-the-financial-services-space.html.
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RegTech alternatives are likely appropriate for local, state, federal and mul-
ti-national regulatory bodies.  They are also likely appropriate for SROs, and 
this Article broadly defines RegTech to include SRO regulatory activities such 
as licensing, disclosure, enforcing professionalism and consequences, and dis-
pute resolution.  Considerable deregulation literature since the 1990s advocated 
self-regulation by private professions, regulation by non-governmental organi-
zations (NGO), and other “soft” regulatory techniques as preferable to invoca-
tion of the power and social costs of operating governmental regulatory sys-
tems.21  For example, online alternative dispute resolution (Online ADR a/k/a 
ODR) systems deployed by regulators, courts,22 and NGOs show promise to 
improve efficiency and gain success.23  This Article reviews experience, sus-
tainability, and future prospects for RegTech deployment at almost any level of 
authority.  It argues that RegTech can narrow the RegLag gap by improving 
regulatory agencies’ ability to perceive events or gain data to assess future 
trends and directions—a key ability for adaptive governance and the successful 
functioning of agencies, as it helps adapt to changing and better capturing regu-
lable activities.24 
I. DEFINING REGULATORY TECHNOLOGY (REGTECH) 
“RegTech” reflects a growing reliance on information technology as the 
main tool of regulation and supervision—”including regulatory data collection, 
 
 21. See, e.g., Colin Scott, Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A Neglected Facet of 
Contemporary Governance, 29 J.L. & SOC’Y 56 (2002); but see David Vogel, The Private Regula-
tion of Global Corporate Conduct: Achievements and Limitations, 49 BUS. & SOC’Y 68 (2010) (ar-
guing private regulation has resulted in some substantive improvements in corporate behavior, it 
cannot be regarded as a substitute for the more effective exercise of state authority at both the na-
tional and international levels). 
 22. See, e.g., Heather Kulp & Amy J. Schmitz, Real Feedback from Real People: Emphasiz-
ing User-Centric Designs for Court ODR, 26 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 6 (2020). 
 23. For example, the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), launched 
in late 1999, arguably settles trademark and other aspects of disputed domain name registrations 
more efficiently than IP trials at law. Given the Internet is an inherently international medium, judi-
cial resolution of domain name disputes would often be cost prohibitive. The UDRP was initiated 
by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) deploying online dispute resolution using 
electronic and expert human facilities of ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers). As a non-judicial, online ADR method, the UDRP represents a RegTech mechanism, 
successfully settling thousands of cases involving both national and international disputes. The 
UDRP exemplifies successful SRO-management. See generally John W. Bagby & John C. Ruhnka, 
Protecting Domain Name Assets, 74 C.P.A.J. at 64, 69 (2004). 
 24. It is true that “[t]o expect clairvoyance or perfection from regulatory agencies would 
indicate a complete lack of reality.” Kevin Kinder, Friendly Skies or Turbulent Skies: An Evaluation 
of the U.S. Airline Industry and Antitrust Concerns, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 943, 981 (2018). However, 
regulatory agencies’ clairvoyance is critical for their successful functioning. See, e.g., Alabama-
Tennessee Nat. Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 359 F. 2d 318, 339 (5th Cir. 1966) (the court held 
that it was correct for the government commission’s decision to depend on its understanding and 
reading of what it believes will happen in future, but that clairvoyance is significant part of a regula-
tory agency’s daily grind). 
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processing, and monitoring of compliance.”25 RegTech is a disruptive phenom-
enon, impacting legacy regulatory enforcement and compliance program tech-
niques, requiring well-reasoned, standard policy principles.26 The United King-
dom’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) was the first to refer to this growing 
sector as such, and describe how it applies to a subcategory of new technologies 
that could better handle regulatory challenges and cybersecurity hazards.27
Even though RegTech has received much attention from the media, schol-
ars, and the private sector,28 it is still challenging to accurately define “Reg-
Tech” as its early exploration period has yet to settle into a steady state. Early 
devotees, product and service vendors, consultants, scholars, and interlopers of 
emerging fields typically vie to leave their mark on the body of knowledge, the 
direction of incremental developments,29 and the general understanding of the 
field’s importance. Each participant’s influence is likely dominated by their 
own interests and abilities. Their ultimate influence, however, is likely limited 
by their inabilities, predispositions, and prejudices. Early stages of a new 
field’s activity present a cacophony of perspectives. Several contemporary ex-
amples are evident, such as smart contracts,30 cryptocurrencies,31 blockchain 
distributed ledger,32 financial technologies,33 and AI analysis34 based on big da-
ta.35 RegTech is unlikely to be an exception.36
25. Saule T. Omarova, Technology v. Technocracy: Fintech as a Regulatory Challenge, 6 J.
FIN. REG. 75, 101 n.119 (2020).
26. See Eva Micheler & Johannes Jiang, Regulatory Technology - Eight Policy Recommen-
dations (LSE LAW POL. BRIEFING PAPER NO. 37, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3423899 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3423899.
27. Michael Piri, The Changing Landscapes of FinTech and RegTech: Why the United States 
Should Create a Federal Regulatory Sandbox, 2 BUS. & FIN. L. REV., 233, 240 (2019).
28. See, e.g., Tom Butler, Towards a Standards-Based Technology Architecture for RegTech 
45 J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION 49 (2017).
29. Some participants may claim their contributions are transformative.
30. Lennart Art, Smart Contracts on the Blockchain – A Bibliometric Analysis and Review
(BRL Working Paper Series No. 10, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3576393 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3576393 (classifying emerging smart contract literature review using 
algorithmic bibliographic categorization into intra-disciplinary tranches; here, a STEM perspective 
on refining the smart contract architecture through innovation, a business and economics view of 
smart contract business implications, and the policy perspective on contracting regimes).
31. See, e.g., Arvind Narayanan, Joseph Bonneau, Edward Felten, Andrew Miller & Steven 
Goldfeder, BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION
(2016).
32. See, e.g., Symposium: Blockchain Technology, Cryptoassets & the Law, 88 UMKC L.
REV. 235, 235–517 (Winter 2019); Carla L. Reyes, Nizan Geslevich Packin & Ben Edwards, Dis-
tributed Governance, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2017), 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=wmlronline.
33. See, e.g., Franklin Allen, Xian Gu & Julapa A. Jagtiani, A Survey of Fintech Research 
and Policy Discussion 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 20–21, 2020) 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3622468 (providing comprehensive FinTech literature review, including, 
“[m]arketplace and peer-to-peer lending, credit scoring, alternative data, distributed ledger technol-
ogies, blockchain, smart contracts, cryptocurrencies and initial coin offerings, central bank digital 
currency, robo-advising, quantitative investment and trading strategies, cybersecurity, identity theft, 
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Whatever RegTech’s main field may be, scholars believe it represents a 
trend toward “the automation and streamlining of regulatory processes.”37
Some argue information technologies dominate in RegTech, including techno-
logical developments of the past 20 years, such as, inter alia, cloud computing, 
artificial intelligence analysis of big data, service provider systems (e.g., SaaS, 
IaaS) and the integration of direct monitoring feeds fused from sensors at regu-
lated entities.38 The early-on conception that RegTech is a mere subset of 
FinTech or a corollary to it39 may be myopic, given the generalizability of both 
regulator techniques and compliance processes.40 This “sectoral” focus was 
likely reinforced by early and seemingly successful vendors of RegTech solu-
tions who dominated RegTech’s early significance.41 Great examples of this 
include the privacy solution product industry’s players, such as vendor execu-
tives, product demonstrations, and engineers who have promoted toothless 
trainings, audits, paper trails, and other privacy compliance symbols rather than 
actual adherence to privacy law.42 Likewise, much of RegTech’s earlier focus 
cloud computing, use of big data and artificial intelligence and machine learning, identity and fraud 
detection, anti-money laundering, Know Your Customers, natural language processing, regtech, 
insuretech, sandboxes, and fintech regulations”); see also John Bagby & David W. Reitter, Antici-
patory FinTech Regulation: On Deploying Big Data Analytics to Predict the Direction, Impact and 
Control of Financial Technology (2019) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3456844 (chronicling historical 
accretion of FinTech innovations by financial institutions, governments, regulators and SROs).
34. Simon Chesterman, Through a Glass, Darkly: Artificial Intelligence and the Problem of 
Opacity (NUS L., Working Paper No. 2020/011, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3575534.
35. See, e.g., John W. Bagby, Scope of Field: On Defining Big Data Analytics Field Devel-
opment in Research and Curricular Design (Research Symposium: Law & Ethics of Big Data, 
2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3631182.
36. Nizan Geslevich Packin, Regtech, Compliance and Technology Judgment Rule, 93 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 193, 207 (2018).
37. Saule T. Omarova, Dealing with Disruption: Emerging Approaches to Fintech Regula-
tion, 61 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 25, 48 (2020).
38. See generally DAVID L. HALL ET AL., MATHEMATICAL TECHNIQUES IN MULTISENSOR 
DATA FUSION (2nd ed. 2004); Multi-Sensor Fusion, U.S. Patent No. 7,283, 904B2 (filed Oct.17, 
2001) (issued Oct. 16, 2007), https://patents.google.com/patent/US7283904B2/en.
39. See, e.g., Fintech and Regtech Win Over Compliance Skeptics, THOMSONREUTERS,
https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/articles/fintech-and-regtech-win-over-compliance-
skeptics; Douglas W. Arner, Jànos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, FinTech, RegTech, and Reconcep-
tualization of Financial Regulation, 37 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371, 376 (2017); Lawrence G. Bax-
ter, Adaptive Financial Regulation and RegTech: A Concept Article on Realistic Protection for Vic-
tims of Bank Failures, 66 DUKE L. J. 567 (2016); Luca Enriques, Financial Supervisors and 
RegTech: Four Roles and Four Challenges, REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT FINANCIER 53 
(2017).
40. See, e.g., Regulatory Technology (RegTech), ERNST & YOUNG (Mar.14, 2019), 
https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_us/topics/financial-services/ey-regulatory-
technology-regtech.pdf.
41. Douglas W. Arner, Jànos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, The Emergence of RegTech 2.0: 
From Know Your Customer to Know Your Data, 44 J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION 79, 79–86 (2016).
42. See Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy Law’s False Promise, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 773 (2020) 
(manuscript at 3, 64), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3339372 (explaining the 
process-oriented approaches to compliance in connection with privacy protections).
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was on the massive amounts of new regulation since the 2008 banking crisis 
which financial industry players had to face in an efficient, effective and cheap 
way.43
A. Deploying Limiting Principles to Defining RegTech
RegTech is an application of technology to many, perhaps even to most, 
regulatory matters.44 There is no inherent limitation of RegTech to any particu-
lar industry or sector like financial services.45 FinTech applications of RegTech 
innovations are not limited to creating or testing compliance46 methods de-
ployed by regulated entities.47 Further, financial services is not the only indus-
try adapting their regulatory compliance methods to information technologies.48
For example, applying various technologies as regulatory tools to handle com-
pletely different issues, such as food safety, traceability, authenticity, and sus-
tainability, is dependent on the “code as law” approach. This approach, which 
is one of many, focuses on regulation as a method with:
“command and control rules, social norms, industry standards, market and architec-
ture, and computer codes. Indeed, technology can be “regulatory” and compliance-
driven through different mechanisms to make “regulation [a] sustained and focused 
attempt to alter the behavior of others according to defined standards or purposes to 
produce a broadly identified . . . outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of 
standard-setting, information-gathering[,] and behavior-modification.” Just as in-
formation and telecommunication technology can force compliance by building in 
43. Gregory Roberts, Fintech Spawns Regtech to Automate Compliance with Regulations,
BLOOMBERG PROF’L SERVS. (June 28, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/professional
/blog/fintech-spawns-regtech-automate-compliance-regulations.
44. See generally Lawrence G. Baxter, Adaptive Financial Regulation and RegTech: A Con-
cept Article on Realistic Protection for Victims of Bank Failures, 66 DUKE L. J. 567 (2016).
45. Google Scholar search of “RegTech” provides some evidence that the top results since 
2016 have a primary focus on financial services, financial crimes and security, and privacy.
46. See Brandon L. Garrett & Gregory Mitchell, Testing Compliance, 83 Law and Contem-
porary Problems (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke L. Scholarship Repository),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3535913.
47. See, e.g., John W. Bagby & David Reitter, Anticipatory FinTech Regulation, supra note
33 (arguing FinTech innovations by regulators and SROs are leading exemplars of RegTech and 
induce compliance RegTech solutions). But see Jake Frankenfield, What You Should Know About 
RegTech, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 27, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/regtech.asp (argu-
ing for a narrow definition of RegTech: “Regtech is the management of regulatory processes within 
the financial industry through technology. The main functions of regtech include regulatory moni-
toring, reporting, and compliance. Regtech, or RegTech, consists of a group of companies that use 
cloud computing technology through software-as-a-service (SaaS) to help businesses comply with 
regulations efficiently and less expensively.”).
48. See, e.g., Lyria Bennet Moses & Monika Zalnieriute, Law and Technology in the Dimen-
sion of Time, TIME, LAW AND CHANGE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY (Sofia Ranchordás & 
Yaniv Roznai eds., 2020) (manuscript at 8), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3461408; Corporate Compliance & Ethics, https://www.corporatecompliance.org/ 
(claiming representation of compliance and ethics professionals “across all industries.”). Also, cata-
log prominent RegTech methods in industries outside financial services.
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automatic braking at stop signs for self-driving cars . . . [technology] can de facto 
shape what is permissive, possible, prohibited, or impossible.”
49
Finally, compliance is not the only RegTech perspective that matters when 
the ultimate goal is achieving proficiency in regulatory process design, imple-
mentation, and maintenance resulting in deeper understanding of the efficacy of 
innovative methods.50 Indeed, RegTech may force a revolution in how legal 
scholarship addresses both administrative law and the regulatory state.51 As 
with some other regulatory programs, not only entities, which are regulated 
tasked with monitoring relevant activities, but all market participants may be 
scrutinized by proposed RegTech deployment.52
Nevertheless, perhaps a limiting principle is needed in the near term to 
make this broad subject manageable. Such a principle might be needed if a 
comprehensive RegTech vision becomes unwieldy as to any or all regulatory 
methods, programs, agencies, and regulated industries worldwide. Perhaps it is 
instructive to consider how administrative regulation has Byzantine roots in 
human history where systematic practices followed well-articulated goals.53
Regulatory process and administrative law have sustained considerable academ-
ic and practitioner interest in the modern era largely when analyzed as it has de-
veloped under U.S. law since the turn of the 20th Century.54
The New Deal experience with regulatory program initiation, unconstitu-
tionality, and endurance likely contributed the most to regulation topics. U.S. 
sustained economic regulation was initially imposed in network industries as 
49. Ching-Fu Lin, Blockchainizing Food Law: Promises and Perils of Incorporating Dis-
tributed Ledger Technologies to Food Safety, Traceability, and Sustainability Governance, 74 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 586, 604–05 (2019).
50. Many scholars and practitioners of regulatory process and administrative law as well as 
compliance vendors and consultants and professional compliance organizations (SRO, bar associa-
tions, AICPA) claim expertise portable over various regulatory programs, industries, and jurisdic-
tions. See, e.g., SOCIETY OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE & ETHICS, https://www.corporate
compliance.org/https://www.corporatecompliance.org/about-scce (last visited Feb. 27, 2021) 
(claiming representation of compliance and ethics professionals “across all industries”).
51. See, e.g., Vicki C. Waye, Regtech: A New Frontier in Legal Scholarship, 40 ADELAIDE 
L. REV. 363 (2019) (arguing RegTech enhances opportunities for legal scholarship given RegTech’s
automated compliance systems and meeting the burden of increased regulatory complexity).
52. See, e.g., Nika Pranata & Alan Ray Farandy, Big Data-Based Peer-to-Peer Lending 
Fintech: Surveillance System through Utilization of Google Play Review (ADBI Working Paper 
943, 2019) (analyzing Google Play data for FinTech innovations like peer-to-peer (P2P) lending 
here in Indonesia where the influence of Islamic finance may impact lending practices); Rüdiger 
Fahlenbrach & Marc Frattaroli, ICO Investors (Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 19-37), 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3419944 (analyzing pseudonymous transactions identified by 
an Ethereum address that may conceal beneficial owners).
53. See, e.g., ANGELIKI E. LAIOU, THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF BYZANTIUM: FROM THE 
SEVENTH THROUGH THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY (Dumbarton Oaks, 2002).
54. Pre-Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulation in the U.S. arose in narrow, 
sometimes episodic fits and spurts. Of course, tax collection is longstanding through human history. 
Regulation of commodities and war material repeatedly occurs during conflict.
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rate-setting under the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.55 Similarly, major 
economic changes took place during the years following the 2008 financial cri-
sis. The 2010’s were characterized by an unprecedented growth in compliance 
laws and regulations,56 which included, inter alia, the creation of the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council—which oversees financial institutions; implements 
and enforces consumer-related finance compliance regulations; establishes re-
quirements for large companies; and examines corporate governance, executive 
compensation practices, and investor protection financial institutions.57 Reg-
Tech has evolved from a narrow, compliance system vendor orientation through 
financial services innovation from both regulatory agency and regulated entity 
perspectives. RegTech is herein expanded to include technological advances on 
all sides of regulatory compliance, across any industry or activity regulated.58
B. Cross-Cutting Themes from Administrative Law
Research in administrative law and regulated industries has long indulged in 
generalization, particularly with standardization across agencies, industries, and 
55. Pub. L. 49–104, 24 Stat. 379 codified as 49 U.S.C. §101 et. seq. Transportation was de-
regulated incrementally, completed with abolition of the ICC in Dec. 1995 under the Interstate 
Commerce Commission Termination Act, Pub. L. 104–88, 109 Stat. 803. Numerous rate and man-
datory service requirements made these regulated industries: freight rail, terminal rail switching 
services, passenger rail, over-the-road motor freight transport, airline service, passenger bus service, 
inter-urban passenger rail, and urban rail. Rate and mandatory service provision spread to energy 
and utilities (e.g., electricity, water, and sewer service), communications (e.g., landline telephone, 
cable TV service, Internet service provision, cellular telephone), and even the provision of heat 
(e.g., steam in NYC). Some argue any rate-setting by statute, rate setting tribunal, or regulatory 
agency rulemaking (informal notice and comment or formal) is a form of economic regulation. Oth-
ers argue economic regulation exists any time regulation impacts the regulated entity’s revenues, 
profitability or capital structure. See generally, John W. Bagby, James R. Evans, & Wallace R. 
Wood, Contracting for Transportation, 22 TRANSP. J. 63–73 (Winter 1982) (arguing some learning 
curve is required in the transition from rate regulation to more open free-market pricing and terms 
determination based on negotiated bi-lateral contracting in freight carriage services).
56. “Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank are just two of the major pieces of recent federal legis-
lation designed to regulate the United States economy.” Renalia Smith DuBose, Compliance-A Ma-
jor Change in Employment Opportunities for Law School Graduates Fueled by Major Changes in 
the Economic History of the United States, 35 W. MICH. & U. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 18 (2019); “In 
2010, the Dodd-Frank [Act] . . . was passed and was the most extensive regulatory reform of Amer-
ican financial institutions since the Great Depression. It was passed as a result of the Great Reces-
sion. The Great Recession lasted from December 2007 to June 2009, during which time the real 
gross domestic product plummeted to its greatest decline since World War II. One of the primary 
reasons for this catastrophic event in America’s economic history was the lack of regulation in the 
financial industry and too much reliance on the stability of large banks.” Id. at 16–17.
57. Id.
58. See UNSGSA FINTECH WORKING GROUP & CAMBRIDGE CENTRE ALTERNATIVE 
FINANCE, EARLY LESSONS ON REGULATORY INNOVATIONS TO ENABLE INCLUSIVE FINTECH:
INNOVATION OFFICES, REGULATORY SANDBOXES, AND REGTECH 31 (2019) (defining RegTech) 
(“[T]he usefulness of RegTech for regulators: for any objective they might have and with any tech-
nology that might help them better regulate and supervise a rapidly digitizing financial market-
place.”).
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regulated activities. Perhaps most importantly, the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA) has achieved considerable consistency across U.S. federal agen-
cies.59 In the twentieth century, APA doctrinal jurisprudence dispersed to many 
of the states as the APA’s principles survived Constitutional challenges and it 
became a well-balanced and efficacious rulebook.60
1.  RegTech on the Compliance-Side
Another widely advocated limiting principle for RegTech is that it focuses 
primarily on compliance by regulated entities. Many early vendors were inno-
vators in providing solutions to facilitate compliance by regulated entities.
However, there are two problems with the solitary focus holding that RegTech 
is simply a form of compliance using information technology platforms.
First, this perspective more likely rewards sectoral vendors in particular in-
dustries. An excessively narrow conceptualization of RegTech places unrea-
sonable blinders on both regulators and regulated industries. Perhaps some in-
sight can be derived from European regulatory process scholars who make clear 
that recognition of RegTech in the EU likely predated much of the intensity of 
focus experienced in the U.S.61
RegTech is a giant field that can improve most of the regulatory tools, tech-
niques, methods, and categories of activities by both regulators and regulated 
entities in their compliance, lobbying, commentaries, and political support or 
opposition.62 Compliance technologies, approved by regulators, that facilitate 
regulator access to the products of compliance, such as direct feeds to disclosed 
information, periodic regulator monitoring, or audit of compliance technology, 
assist both regulated entity compliance and regulator investigations and en-
forcement. RegTech should be broadened to include both perspectives, regula-
tors, and compliance.63
59. 5 U.S.C. §551 et. seq.
60. Of course, there are some regulatory programs that “enjoy” APA exceptions or operate 
under statutory mandates endowing these agencies and programs with procedural rules separate 
from the APA. See, e.g., John H. Frye III, Survey of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs in the Federal 
Government, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 261 (1992) (generalizing about non-APA strictures); John D. Gra-
ham & James W. Broughel, Stealth Regulation: Addressing Agency Evasion of OIRA and the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 1 HARV. J.L.& PUB. POLICY 30 (Federalist ed.) (2014).
61. MICHÈLE FINCK, BLOCKCHAIN REGULATION AND GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2019).
62. See Omarova, supra note 37, at 49 (stating that “RegTech offers more than simply a new 
set of tools for increasing regulatory capacity—it potentially offers an alternative regulatory philos-
ophy.”).
63. Academic authors naturally focus on how RegTech compliance and the regulator’s tech-
nologically enabled perspective will impact students. RegTech will integrate into the curricula of 
undergraduate and graduate education in business and information science disciplines as well as into 
law school curricula. Once generally known as Business Law and the Legal Environment of Busi-
ness, business-oriented regulatory disciplines continue to evolve as the weight of emerging topics 
like RegTech become important to graduates as well as in faculty research. The regulatory compo-
nent of curricular requirements for professional qualification and licensing also will drive the uptake 
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The second problem with the solitary focus on RegTech as a form of com-
pliance using information technology platforms is that this perspective ignores 
that information technology can be used by businesses to evade regulations and 
frustrate regulators, a phenomenon referred to as anti-RegTech.64 RegTech is a 
tool that enables companies to automate, grow more effective, and improve 
compliance, but this can only happen if we operate under the assumption that a 
company does what it is supposed to do. But the determination of what a com-
pany is supposed to do can look very different in the eyes of the company ver-
sus the government. The first is decided based on a company’s leadership busi-
ness and culture values,65 and the other is the result of constantly changing and 
not-uniformly enforced regulations created by governmental agencies.66
Ethics are different from compliance. Ethics are concerned with doing the 
right thing because of a moral conviction. However, one obeys the law not be-
cause it is necessarily the right things to do, but because one is required to do so 
and has to meet a bare legal minimum—compliance.67 A company can be 
compliant, but not be doing “the right thing.” For example, the recent RegTech 
trend of banks seeking to automatically calculate precise capital allocations re-
quired to pass the government’s stress tests while maximizing returns is con-
of RegTech studies. Topics both typical to instruction and research at accredited programs in and 
outside the U.S. form a limiting principle for RegTech scholarship by faculty. This limitation may 
not be as restrictive because higher education in business scholarship generally explores a whole 
panoply of compliance methods and regulator activities enhanced by technology covering all regu-
latory programs and regulatory methods. For example, traditional regulatory program curricula in 
AASCB accredited programs, in both required and elective courses, could focus at least some Reg-
Tech attention. The recurring themes over the long term, particularly those having content assuming 
significant class-contact should initially be considered, such as, antitrust, securities regulations, fi-
nancial services, environmental law, occupational safety and health, labor and employment, bank-
ing, and real estate. Additional topics could also be relevant to setting the RegTech scope, such as 
rate regulation in transportation, utilities, essential facilities, privacy, intellectual property (IP), 
technology management, communications, the Internet, insurance, food and drugs, health care, 
gambling, and insolvency management. Many of these fields of regulation overlap, such as how real 
estate involves professionalism and certification, environmental compliance, insolvency manage-
ment, real estate financial services, hedging investments, and loan packaging.
64. See Packin, supra note 36, at 212–14.
65. SEC Chairman Christopher Cox spoke about best practices in establishing an ethical 
culture in U.S. companies. He said, “Without a doubt, the best practice of all in any company is to 
set the right tone at the top. Over and over again, commissioners and staff at the SEC observe that 
the tone at the top is a major factor in determining the effectiveness of internal controls to prevent 
fraud, in treating customers, employees, investors and other stakeholder fairly, and in contributing 
to the long-term success of the organization. Leadership by example, good communication, and on-
going ethics education and training are all vital.” Frank C. Bucaro, Q&A with Christopher Cox,
SPEAKER MAG. at 22 (Sept. 2007), http://www.nsaspeaker-magazine.org/nsaspeaker
/200709/?pg=1#pg1.
66. See generally Eric C. Chaffee, Creating Compliance: Exploring a Maturing Industry, 48 
U. TOL. L. REV. 429 (2017) (explaining that “business compliance is a field that focuses on prospec-
tively ensuring adherence to laws and regulations through the use of monitoring, policies, and other 
internal controls,” and stating several events in the history of the modern corporation that have 
spurred the current period of rapid growth in the compliance field).
67. See Packin, supra note 36, at 212–14.
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cerning.68 Banks are under pressure to manage their capital and liquidity effec-
tively and would prefer to not hold additional capital if they can calculate the 
exact minimal required capital level, as holding more impacts their profitability 
and net margins. Yet, the 2008 crisis showed that the Federal Reserve should
constantly and carefully assess whether the biggest banks are strong enough to 
continue lending if the economy plunges into a severe downturn. And we must 
make sure that the banks understand the importance of this assessment, rather 
than try to use technology to get as close as possible to evade regulations and 
frustrate their purpose. Additionally, the biggest corporations, including finan-
cial institutions, should not solely rely on RegTech to exactly calculate such 
critical, critical ratios, just to increase profitability because doing so clearly 
promotes an unethical business culture.69
Similarly, although companies have cybersecurity, financial stability, priva-
cy, corporate governance, and other policies, those typically cover only the bare 
minimum that the law requires.70 Indeed, RegTech can be used for both legiti-
mate and illegitimate purposes. Therefore, used in a non-ideal way, businesses 
can use technology to successfully stick to the regulatory bare minimum or, 
even when legally possible, promote anti-RegTech. This anti-RegTech phe-
nomenon means basically evading regulation or frustrating regulators’ goals and 
is clearly not increasing ethical behavior at companies. It only pushes business-
es and their compliance professionals to foster the very behaviors that regula-
tion was intended to prevent. Moreover, while there is no law against anti-
RegTech, there are many ways in which anti-RegTech can breach local law and 
regulation depending on the circumstances.71 “It is not enough to have one le-
gitimate purpose if the technology can (and is) being used for regulation-
defeating purposes.”72 For example, the recent RegTech trend of financial insti-
tutions trying to automatically calculate the exact capital allocations needed to 
pass governmental agencies’ stress tests while maximizing returns is a bit con-
cerning.73 Banks’ profits depend on managing capital and liquidity levels as 
effectively as possible—they try to avoid holding more capital than required, as 
68. Nizan Packin, Is RegTech The Answer To Corporate Governance And Risk Management 




70. See, e.g., Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance 
Through Organizational Values and Culture, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 961, 966 (2012) 
(“‘[C]ommand-and-control’ oriented [compliance] programs . . . [provide] [t]he explicit message 
[that] is the same as the message from law enforcement: follow the rules or pay the penalty.”).
71. See Packin, supra note 36, at 212–14.
72. Jack Nelson, The Rise of Anti-Regtech? LEXOLOGY (Apr. 5, 2017),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=86320a8b-c385-4c29-b39c-c7dec328ce54.
73. Nathan DiCamillo, Startups Take on Stress-Testing Tech, AM. BANKER (Jan. 20, 2019, 
9:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/startups-take-on-stress-testing-tech?brief=
00000161-04ae-d710-ad71-f6beb7c70000.
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holding more impacts profitability and net margins—and constantly attempting 
to find the minimal capital level required.74 But one of the 2008 financial cri-
sis’ lessons was that the Fed must constantly assess if the largest banks are 
strong enough to be able to lend if the economy takes a major hit. Yet, while 
the banks understand how critical these assessments are, some still try to use 
information technology to evade regulations and frustrate this important regula-
tory goal while still operating in the legal boundaries and being compliant.75
Thus, the largest financial institutions should not solely rely on RegTech to 
most accurately calculate any such critical ratios in order to maximize profita-
bility because doing so might pass as legitimate in terms of legal compliance, 
but nonetheless promotes an unethical business culture.76
2.  Relaxing RegTech Limiting Principles
This Article focuses on RegTech, which is the management of regulatory 
processes—in any specific industry—through technology, in the financial ser-
vices context. Specifically, it zooms in on the financial service providers’ regu-
latory compliance perspective. But, as the RegTech phenomena moves for-
ward, successful dispersal of RegTech innovations from successful deployments 
in some sectors into various other regulated industry sectors will help decipher 
what RegTech includes, what should constitute as RegTech, and whether regu-
latory technologies will truly be transformative.77
As can be assumed, entities that have in recent years invested in compliance 
management systems (CMS’s)78 experience a reduction in the likelihood of 
noncompliance.79 The CMS’s help address compliance issues in multiple fronts 
and areas of operations, including finance, environment, health care, workplace 
74. See Packin, supra note 68.
75. See DiCamillo, supra note 73 (“With manual processes, it is difficult for banks to create 
a detailed analysis. Wherever there is ambiguity about data sets, banks will err on the side of con-
servatism and set aside more capital than is perhaps necessary. . . There is [therefore] a renewed 
interest in investing in stress-testing technology because banks may have a chance to argue for low-
er liquidity requirements. . . Stress testing is definitely becoming a focus in regtech.”).
76. See Packin, supra note 68.
77. See e.g. Cheng-Yun Tsang, From Industry Sandbox to Supervisory Control Box: Re-
thinking the Role of Regulators in the Era of FinTech, 2019 J.L. TECH.& POL’Y 355–402 (2019), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3420539 (focusing on the financial sector, discussing the fast develop-
ments of technology and advocating the use of regulatory and supervisory technology by regulators, 
and how transformative and useful technology-enhancing initiatives such as industry sandboxes are 
in effective regulation).
78. See FDIC: DIVISION OF DEPOSITOR AND CONSUMER PROTECTION, COMPLIANCE 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (CMS), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/director/presentations
/cms.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2017) (detailing how “[t]he Board of Directors is ultimately responsi-
ble for developing and administering a CMS that ensures compliance with federal consumer protec-
tion laws and regulations,” a move that makes each private company essentially its own regulator).
79. Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Compliance Management Systems: Do They Make a 
Difference? 34 (Univ. of Pa. Carey Law Sch. Inst. for Law and Econ., Research Paper No. 20-35, 
2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3598264.
Spring 2021] RegTech and Predictive Lawmaking 143
health and safety, and much more.80 These systems help create organized, all 
inclusive, checklist-like procedures that help executives upgrade their compa-
nies’ compliance using government regulation.81 These systems also enable 
managers to better identify regulatory compliance liabilities, determine and as-
sign reasonability, monitor progress, and, when needed, intervene, supervise, 
and even modify things as they see fit.82 Despite the belief that CMS’s help 
improve enforcement of obligations and lower noncompliance by making more 
information available to the relevant stakeholders, institute useful internal in-
centives to better fix noncompliance situations, and generate a compliance cul-
ture, evidence shows that CMS’s only show modest improvements in risk man-
agement.83 The banks’ stress tests example mentioned above illustrates such a 
situation: despite complying with the capital requirements in the most efficient 
and accurate way, there would not be much improvement in risk management if 
banks still try to go above the legally required level as little as technologically 
possible. A significant difference depends on also instituting demands for ap-
propriate managerial attitudes, changed organizational cultures, and information 
technologies, which go beyond the CMSs.84
II. REGTECH IN THE GOVERNMENT’S SERVICE
This Article focuses on RegTech, reviews key RegTech exemplars for suc-
cess and failure,85 and discusses RegTech structures within conventional regula-
tory methods. It argues that various RegTech methods could help government 
agencies predict in areas where RegLag is likely to occur and help regulators—
who, despite popular belief, are quite effective86—minimize RegLag. Shorten-
ing lag time is key, especially because regulators suffer from chronic agency 
80. Id. at 5.
81. Id. at 7–8.
82. Id. at 5.
83. Id. at 34.
84. Id. at 5, 34.
85. See, e.g., GAO, CMS Has Taken Steps to Address Problems, but Needs to Further Im-
plement Systems Development Best Practices (2015), https://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668834.pdf 
(demonstrating that government websites have racked up a number of alleged failures, including the 
failed launch of Healthcare.gov registration); see also GAO, Actions Needed to Enhance Infor-
mation Security and Privacy Controls (2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676003.pdf; Alleged 
insufficiencies of COVID 19 relief applications at both state and federal levels reinforce the risks of 
eGovernment rollout failures. See, e.g., Morning Edition, Small Businesses Say They’re Still Wait-
ing For COVID-19 Relief Funds, NPR (April 9, 2020, 5:02 AM, https://www.npr.org/2020
/04/09/830474620/small-businesses-say-theyre-still-waiting-for-covid-19-relief-funds; Ledyard 
King, As the Trump Administration Praises Coronavirus Relief Program, Lenders and Small Busi-
nesses Criticize Delays, USA TODAY (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money
/2020/04/03/coronavirus-program-rescue-small-businesses-beset-delays/2942796001/.
86. See generally JOHN M. STEVENS ET AL., BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS AND 
INTERDEPENDENCE: A MANAGERIAL AND ANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE (Quorum Books, 1988) (demon-
strating far less disrespect for regulatory personnel from among private-sector managers than was 
well represented in common sarcastic derision).
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underfunding, which increases their lagging time and results in them as unwill-
ing Luddites in deploying new technology.87 
The RegTech methods that regulators typically use include: 
•     Big data collections and analytics.88 
•     Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) based tools.89 
•     Statistical and analytics-informed insights to guide government agen-
cies’ enforcement.90 
•     Biometrics and the interpretation of social media.91 
•     The vast proliferation of sensors throughout regulated supply chains. 
 
Regulated entities may deploy similar technologies in their compliance ef-
forts to collect, format, confidentially submit, and publicly disclose real-time 
or bulk information.92  RegTech is also expected to require novel forensic 
techniques beyond the mandatory reporting regime underlying some early 
RegTech solutions.93  These RegTech methods, usages, and challenges sug-
gest design elements for this Article’s Anticipatory RegTech Model.94 
A. Bringing Technologies into the Regulatory Agency Process 
Federal and state efforts to bring technologies into the regulatory agency 
process have become more noticeable.95  One such example is deregulation, 
 
 87. See, e.g., Omarova, supra note 25, at 77 (“Facing the myriad of pressing demands to fill 
various immediately salient ‘gaps’ in the existing legal framework, policymakers often do not have 
the luxury of taking a step back and reflecting on the bigger issues posed by the spread of new tech-
nologies in finance.”). 
 88. See, e.g., Taha Havakhor et al., Big Data, Retail Investors, and Financial Markets 
(March 26, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3434812 (arguing big data availability increases trading 
volume). 
 89. See, e.g., Matt High, How AI and Machine Learning Are Driving RegTech Innovation, 
FinTech Magazine (June 29, 2020), https://www.fintechmagazine.com/venture-capital/how-ai-and-
machine-learning-are-driving-regtech-innovation. 
 90. See, e.g., ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF POLICING IN 
THE UNITED STATES 492–510 (Tamara Rice Lave & Eric J. Miller eds., Cambridge Univ. Press, 
2019). 
 91. Packin, supra note 36. 
 92. Bulk Data Repository, U.S. GOV’T PUBL’G OFF., https://www.govinfo.gov/bulkdata 
(some data derived from regulated entity disclosures are accessible as “bulk data” through GitHub). 
 93. See, e.g., HANK C.C HUANG & TABF EDITORIAL BOARD, BASIC KNOWLEDGE ON 
FINTECH 189 (2020) (e-book). 
 94. See, e.g., DELOITTE CTR. FOR GOV’T INSIGHTS, GOV’T TRENDS 2020, at 40–45 (2019), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/government-trends-
2020/DI_Government-Trends-2020.pdf (arguing preemptive regulatory scanning, some deploying 
AI, could be useful in areas like attenuating crime and human trafficking, preparing for natural dis-
asters, food inspection, hardening cybersecurity by predicting cyberattacks, reducing homelessness, 
child abuse prevention, and vehicle accident avoidance). 
 95. The trend of regulators using technology to improve their supervision and regulation has 
been on the rise in recent years. See EY, How Can Technology Enable Government Agency Trans-
formations?, GOVT. TECH. (June 16, 2020), https://www.govtech.com/gov-experience/How-can-
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which lawmakers push for by encouraging the use of technology in order 
achieve statutory goals while at the same time reducing the burden of regula-
tion.96 Such efforts characterize the Carter, Clinton, and Obama Administra-
tions. However, the deregulation waves of the Reagan, Bush (both), and Trump 
administrations97 were less about refinement of regulation to maintain goal 
achievement and more about dismantling regulatory programs to the extent po-
litically possible.98 In particular, the Trump administration launched a cam-
paign against the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) shortly after 
the 2016 Presidential elections, largely because of its structure,99 which Con-
gress especially crafted in 2010 in order to protect the bureau’s work and mis-
technology-enable-government-agency-transformations.html (“From AI to RPA, technology is 
transforming the working world —and government agencies are no exception.”); Douglas W. Arner 
et. al., Fintech, Regtech, and the Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37 NW. J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 371, 394–97 (2017). In the U.S., much has been said about the adoption of new innovative 
technologies and their administrability for law enforcement. See, e.g., Emma Raviv, Homing in: 
Technology’s Place in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 593, 594 (2015) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court has faced and answered difficult questions about technology’s role in priva-
cy and criminal procedure . . . [T]he Court . . . [discussed] government agencies using technolo-
gy . . . .”). But governments’ efforts to bring technologies into regulatory agencies are trending all 
over the world. For example, in Israel, commonly referred to as the Startup Nation, the government 
has created the Israel Innovation Authority, as it understood long ago the importance of regulating 
agencies constantly updating their usages of technology in order to conduct their work more effec-
tively and efficiently. See, e.g., ISRAEL INNOVATION AUTHORITY, Incentive Programs for Innova-
tion with Government Entities, https://innovationisrael.org.il/en/program/incentive-programs-
innovation-government-entities (last visited August 20, 2020) (“[c]ollaboration between the Innova-
tion Authority and the various government ministries enables to focus government effort in selected 
fields, including. . . supplementary support of regulatory entities with the regulatory requirements 
for pilot tests, access to government-owned trial sites and facilities, significant impact on the growth 
of Israeli companies, and the creation of market influence from technological application in further 
levels of the local innovation ecosystem.”).
96. See, e.g., Rob Nicholls, How to Use Regulatory Technology to Get Deregulation Right,
UNSW BUSINESS SCHOOL: BUSINESS THINK (July 7, 2020), https://www.businessthink.unsw.edu.au
/articles/regulatory-technology-deregulation.
97. See generally Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Chevronizing Around Cost-Benefit 
Analysis: Deregulation in the Trump Administration, DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2021), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3538456 (discussing the Trump administration’s efforts to weaken regula-
tions).
98. See, e.g., BARRY D. FRIEDMAN, REGULATION IN THE REGAN-BUSH ERA: THE ERUPTION 
OF PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE (Univ. Pitt Press 1995); Rachel Augustine Potter, The Trump Admin-
istration’s Regulatory Corner-Cutting Isn’t Just Bad For Democracy—It’s A Bad Strategy,
BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-trump-administrations-
regulatory-corner-cutting-isnt-just-bad-for-democracy-its-a-bad-strategy/; Patricia A. McCoy, In-
side Job: The Assault on the Structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 103 MINN. L.
REV. 2543 (2019) (describing how after the Trump Administration took power, the new leadership 
declared outright war on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) and tried to de-regulate 
much of the issues the Bureau has focused its power on).
99. Commentators criticized the CFPB’s unique structure, which was the subject of the Su-
preme Court’s holding in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020), as further explained be-
low.
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sion from narrow political interests.100 The campaign against the CFPB contin-
ued with the appointment of a new Acting Director, who halted the implementa-
tion of specific regulation and slowed down regulatory enforcement efforts.101
Finally, the deregulation attempts included seeking a Supreme Court’s holding 
on the CFPB’s structure and scope of work.102 Specifically, Seila Law LLC v. 
CFPB zoomed in on the CFPB’s single leader’s independent tenure protections, 
which attempted to enable the agency to better protect consumers, but allegedly 
gave too much power to the agency’s director.103 Agreeing with the CFPB’s
opponents’ structure argument, on June 29, 2020, the Supreme Court held that 
the leadership structure was unconstitutional.104 Therefore, in the longer term, 
Seila’s biggest effect will probably be that every elected president likely ap-
points a new CFPB director, similarly to the appointment of new Cabinet mem-
bers.105
The CFPB deregulation campaign supports a developing argument that a 
strong form of presidency is emerging, which diminishes traditional checks and 
balances.106 This Presidentialism is characterized by suppression of agency 
statutory mission when the presidential administration seeks “sub rosa” deregu-
100. See McCoy, supra note 98, at 2545 (“Once the Trump Administration took power, the 
new leadership and industry declared outright war on the Bureau. The assault came from all sides: 
from the Republican-controlled Congress, from the new Administration, and from the courts. Inter-
estingly, the target was not so much the substance of federal consumer financial laws as the struc-
ture of the CFPB itself. The attack on structure was based on the premise that the CFPB’s effective-
ness was largely a product of its structure and that undermining that structure was essential to 
neutering the Bureau.”)
101. See Leonard Kennedy et al., The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial 
Regulation for the 21st Century, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1146–49 (2012) (describing the powers 
Congress bestowed on the CFPB).
102. John Kruzel & Harper Neidig, The 7 Most Anticipated Supreme Court Decisions,
THE HILL (June 7, 2020), https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/501437-the-7-most-
anticipated-supreme-court-decisions.
103. See Richard Cordray, Why the CFPB’s Loss at The Supreme Court is Really a Win,
WASH. POST (June 29, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/29/why-cfpbs-
loss-supreme-court-is-really-win/.
104. Id. But, despite that holding, seven of the nine justices left untouched all other aspects of 
the agency’s operations, with Chief Justice Roberts commenting that “the CFPB’s structure and 
duties remain fully operative without the offending tenure restriction.”
105. Nizan Geslevich Packin, Show Me the (Data About) the Money!,5 UTAH L. REV. 1277, 
1292 (2020).
106. See, e.g., Joshua Galperin, The Death of Administrative Democracy, 82 PITT. L. REV.
1(2020) (arguing judicial expansion of presidential powers, an ascendant Presidentialism, re-creates 
majoritarianism with the electorate indirectly controlling the administrative state through majority 
election of the president); Julian Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley, Delegation at the Founding (Univ. 
of Michigan L. Sch. Pub. L. Research Paper No. 658, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3512154 
(arguing recent resurrection of non-delegation, severely limiting independence of regulatory agency 
rulemaking discretion from presidential policy dictates, is inconsistent with the Founders’ intent); 
Andrew Coan, Eight Futures of the Nondelegation Doctrine (Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Pa-
per No. 20-01), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3516976.
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lation.107  Predictably, some Libertarians view it as just the opposite: liberal 
presidential administrations seek to aggressively expand agency authority be-
yond the confines of their statutory missions, such as when re-regulation is the 
presidential goal.108  Presidential administration suppression of regulatory agen-
cy information collection, consideration of opposing argument and open delib-
eration worsens this collapse of the independent administrative state.109  In such 
environments, RegTech advancements can probably follow two paths—either 
RegTech becomes less effective, or it remains the only viable regulatory meth-
od to achieve agency statutory goals. 
1.  Electronic Government Underpinnings 
Since RegTech flourishes most using AI and immediate access to data, 
proper legislation must orient the information foundations of government-
inspired RegTech.  The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980110 is a great example 
of such a statute, as it controls the manner and purposes for which regulatory 
programs require recordkeeping and disclosure by regulated entities.  Amended 
in 1995,111 the Act centralizes coordination in the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), requires the ubiquitous OMB approval manifest as “control 
numbers,” and establishes the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(OIRA) as the central clearinghouse for federal forms.  Federal agencies must 
justify regulations that impose recordkeeping and disclosure requirements with 
objectives, planning and testing the uses envisioned for the information, esti-
mating the burden created, and ensuring “quality, objectivity, utility, and integ-
rity of information.”112 
Similarly, the eGovernment Act of 2002,113 including its imbedded Federal 
Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) and amendments enacted as 
“FISMA reform” in the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 
2014114 further empower the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) to set cybersecurity standards that impact RegTech at all federal agen-
 
 107. Matthew J. Steilen, Presidential Whim, (Univ. of Buffalo Sch. of L. Studies Research 
Paper No. 2019-015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3557903 (arguing for legislation to enforce presi-
dential decision-making to be based on values like faith, faithfulness, responsibility, honesty, due 
care, and professionalism and less on “presidential whim”). 
 108. See, e.g., David Boaz, For This Libertarian, Obama’s First Year Looks Grim, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (Jan.20, 2010), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=122762284. 
 109. See, e.g., Robert L. Glicksman, Shuttered Government, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 634 (2020) 
(arguing RegTech information access initiatives at regulatory agencies suffering reversals). 
 110.  Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Information Quality Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3516 (2000). 
 113. E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 101. 
 114. Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, 44 U.S.C. § 3551. 
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cies.115  Indeed, even Presidential administrations, which have adopted different 
approaches regarding the ideal intensity of regulation, opined on cyber security 
of regulatory agency information systems as well as on regulated entities.116 
Particularly as the personally identifiable information (PII) aspects of affected 
parties’ privacy is concerned, federal and state governments117 have an increas-
ingly stringent position on how well regulatory methods provide information 
security. 
The U.S. government has made many RegTech advances by making agency 
data holdings both standardized and accessible, impacting FOIA responsibili-
ties.  The amount of Federal data produced, collected, and retained is extraordi-
nary and presidential initiatives lie at the heart of this information bonanza.  In 
2005, George W. Bush’s Exec. Order No. 13,392118 required strategic FOIA 
planning, encouraged FOIA requests, encouraged data access on agency web-
sites, and required FOIA officer designation.  FOIA compliance oversight is 
delegated to the Attorney General and OMB.  President Obama’s Exec. Order 
No.13,642 created a comprehensive federal open data policy and this inspired 
statutory reaffirmation of open data under the OPEN Act.119  Under the OPEN 
Act, government data should be complete, timely, accessible to the widest range 
of users, configured in machine-readable formats, non-discriminatory, non-
proprietary and license free.120  Government sources of regulated entity data can 
inform confirmation of regulator effectiveness, regulatory program efficacy and 
regulated entity compliance success. 
Sponsored research grantors increasingly mandate that data developed in 
the funded research be made available broadly.  While enabling replication of 
research as validation, it represents a RegTech disclosure requirement.  Under 
National Science Foundation (NSF) rules: 
Investigators are expected to share with other researchers, at no more than incre-
mental cost and within a reasonable time, the primary data, samples, physical col-
lections and other supporting materials created or gathered in the course of work 
 
 115. DoD cybersecurity is generally a superset of NIST standards as control over weapons 
systems carries higher potential costs than many other regulatory program foci. 
 116. See Exec. Order No. 13636, 3 C.F.R. § 217 (2014); see also Exec.Order No. 13873, 3 
C.F.R. § 317 (2020). 
 117. See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. See also Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809; Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–
6506; California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.100-1798.199; Health In-
surance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §1320d. 
 118. Exec. Order No. 13392, 3 C.F.R. § 217 (2006). 
 119. Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-435, 
§§ 201–202, 132 Stat. 5529, 5534–44 (2019). 
 120. See, e.g., Austin Klawitter, New Law Could Make US Government Data Much More 
Useful, THE GLOBE POST (Feb. 14, 2019), https://theglobepost.com/2019/02/14/open-government-
data/. 
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under NSF grants. Grantees are expected to encourage and facilitate such shar-
ing.
121
The Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2018122 makes a 
stronger policy mandate for open sharing of sponsored research that supports 
curricular development. Additional rulemakings impact federally funded re-
search, very positively impacting accessibility of data developed in federally 
sponsored research. The OMB Open Data Memorandum (OMB M-13-13)123
and Project Open Data and the Foundations for Evidence-based Policymaking 
Memorandum (OMB M-19-23)124 make NSF and other agencies responsible to 
maintain data inventories of all data resources.
Lastly, many governments’ constructed databases receive “value-added”
enhancements by the private sector. For example, weather information is col-
lected, standardized, and organized by the National Weather Service. These da-
ta are successfully repackaged125 by print and broadcast media.126 Global posi-
tioning system (GPS) data has unleashed cartographic, geographic, 
wayfinding/routing, precision farming, battlefield navigation, location of ser-
vices, supporting equipment and control, and many other modern travel conven-
iences.127 Integration128 of disparate domains of data from local, state, and na-
121. See, e.g., Proposal and Award Policies and Procedures Guide, Ch. XI: Other Post 
Award Requirements and Considerations, D. Intellectural Property, 4. Dissemination and Sharing 
of Research Results, sec. b., THE NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.nsf.gov
/pubs/policydocs/pappg19_1/nsf19_1.pdf.
122. Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115, 435, 132 
Stat. 5529.
123. See Memorandum from Sylvia M. Burwell, Dir. of the Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. 
Off. of the President et al., to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (May 9, 2013), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2013/m-13-13.pdf.
124. See Memorandum from Russell T. Vought, Acting Dir. of the Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, 
Exec. Off. of the President, to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (July 10, 2019), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/M-19-23.pdf.
125. See, e.g., Nat’l Weather Serv., NOAA, Value of a Weather-Ready Nation (2011), 
https://www.performance.noaa.gov/wp-content/uploads/PPI-Weather-Econ-Stats-10-13-11.pdf.
126. PA Senator Rick Santorum was sole sponsor of the National Weather Service Duties Act 
of 2005 (NWSDA), S.786, 109th Cong. (2005). The sponsor’s introductory statement/remarks on 
April 14, 2005 make clear that the legislation was inspired by a belief that private sector firms using 
value-added business models, in some industries, have the “right to expect these [federal administra-
tive] agencies to minimize unnecessary, competitive, and commercial-type activities, not be sub-
jected to competition with government agencies,” see 151 CONG.REC. S.3658 (2005). But, opposi-
tion to the privatization of theretofore public open source information, when essential to safety, is 
arguably detrimental to the public interest, see, Air Traffic Services Brief—National Weather Ser-
vice Duties Act of 2005—Santorum Bill S. 786, AOPA (Apr. 28, 2005, 10:08 A.M.), 
https://www.aopa.org/advocacy/advocacy-briefs/air-traffic-services-brief-national-weather-service-
duties-act-of-2005-santorum-bill-s-786.
127. Phillip Yam, How to Kick-Start Innovation with Free Data, SCI. AM. (March 23, 2013), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-to-kick-start-innovaton/.
128. Enterprise architecture is a sub-field of information science that integrates data by facili-
tating communication and data interchange among people, machines and computers, see, e.g., F.B.
VERNADAT, ENTERPRISE MODELING AND INTEGRATION: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS (Chapman 
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tional governmental repositories can be combined to produce other impressive 
services, such as real estate valuations in Zillow.129
III. A REGULATORY LAG THEORY (REGLAG)
Regulatory policy deployment has followed general patterns similar to the
development of both the common law and statutory enactment. The basic pat-
tern begins with (i) some human need or inspiration that, (ii) arouses ingenuity 
or activity, (iii) that allegedly causes harm, (iv) eventually some of these activi-
ties become notorious, (v) that contributes to building sufficient will among a 
constituency endowed with political power or legal authority, leading to, (vi) 
debate over policy changes that finally, (vii) results in enactment of policy 
change. The common law relies on judge and jury determinations that become 
habitual as precedent. The forces of public policy exert influence on legislative 
enactment. Agency research, as well as lobbying from regulated entities and 
affected parties, channel regulators’ choices in decision-making on policy, in-
vestigations, and enforcement (de)emphasis.
All these lawmaking routes involve delay. For example, computer hacking 
occurred for decades before relevant legislation was enacted and enforced. In 
the 1980’s individuals that manipulated telecommunication systems were typi-
cally not prosecuted. Such individuals, referred to as phreakers,130 used soft-
ware in order to get calling card numbers and create basic tone devices that en-
ables them to place phone calls for free. Likewise, a sub-category of phreakers, 
which were more sophisticated and skilled in information systems conducted 
more advanced phreaking activities. However, since there were no laws and no 
governmental agencies with the needed expertise, hardly any hackers were 
prosecuted until Operation Sundevil.131 Thus, there was a long delay between 
the time the first phreaks started operating in the early 1970’s and the mid-
& Hall, London, 1st ed.1996); Enterprise Integration Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–277, 116 Stat. 
1936, 1938 (Nov. 5, 2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 278g) (defining “enterprise integration” as “ the 
electronic linkage of manufacturers, assemblers, suppliers, and customers”).
129. Vivek Kundra, Digital Fuel of the 21st Century: Innovation through Open Data and the 
Network Effect, Joan Shorenstein Ctr. on the Press, Pol. and Pub. Pol’y Discussion Paper Series #D-
70, Jan. 2012, at 1,16.
130. Phreakers are defined as “someone who likes to play with the phone system.” See Ken-
neth Rosenblatt, HIGH-TECHNOLOGY CRIME: INVESTIGATING CASES INVOLVING COMPUTERS 126 
(1995). Phreakers are experts in using telephone devices and systems for their own, free, use. Via 
equipment like blue boxes, Phreakers make global toll-free calls. Frequently, Phreakers use or sell 
stolen credit card numbers or telephone account numbers. Id.
131. Alexander Urbelis, Toward A More Equitable Prosecution of Cybercrime: Concerning 
Hackers, Criminals, and the National Security, 29 VT. L. REV. 975, 977 (2005) (“On May 8, 1990, 
the most sweeping computer-crime crackdown to date occurred, unprecedented in scope and public-
ity. It was known as Operation Sundevil. The investigation was not directed towards intrusions of 
federal-interest computers, national security, or other such lofty state interests. Rather, Operation 
Sundevil sought to combat the ‘traditional scourges of the [then] digital underground: credit card 
theft and telephone code abuse.’”).
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1980’s, which is when the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act & Computer Securi-
ty Act of 1987 were passed.132 Another notable example of a delay in regula-
tion can be found in connection with privacy rights. While several scholars re-
alized the importance of privacy in the past,133 it is only in the 2000’s that pri-
privacy has become a topic of wide discussion.134 Yet despite the clear need for 
regulation concerning privacy rights and consumer protection, such regulation 
in the U.S. is very much delayed.135
This lag in lawmaking is not surprising.136 The common law does not have 
the agility to keep pace with increasingly fast changes in culture, society, and 
especially in technology and innovation,137 partially because it was not histori-
cally designed to keep up with the modern evolution of technology.138 The re-
sult is a typical regulatory lag between modern era social changes or cultural 
norms and the capability of regulating them efficiently in general, and in partic-
ular when the changes are the result of innovation or technology.139 Additional-
ly, some lawmaking delay is based in libertarian resistance to external control.
Human actors imagine transparency will trigger unwelcome responses. Stealth 
human activity is often disguised as benign behavior. Tradition often justifies 
tolerating static customary institutions. Rational analysis of economic effects 
and the consequences of the human condition take time to assess. Contributions 
from academic researchers may lag because faculty still have their day jobs.
Delay is a habitual response leading to slow change while change is often 
staunchly resisted.140 Regulator agility is chronically delayed. As the Supreme 
132. Computer Fraud and Abuse Law of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2190 (1984) (cod-
ified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Supp. III 1985)), amended by Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213 (1986) 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Supp. V 1987)).
133. See, e.g., Samuel D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
134. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154(3) U. PENN. L. REV. 477 (2006); 
Ira Rubinstein & Nathan Good, Privacy by Design: A Counterfactual Analysis of Google and Face-
book Privacy Incidents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1333 (2013).
135. Currently, most of the federal laws around privacy rights date back to the 1960’s, 1970’s, 
1980’s and 1990’s—times in which the internet was not as nearly developed. See, e.g., Freedom of 
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1232g (1974); Privacy Act, Pub. L. No.93–579 (1974); Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 
Pub. L. No. 99-508 (1986); Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1721(1994); Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104–191 (1996); and Financial Services Mod-
ernization Act (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), Pub. L. 106–102(1999).
136. See supra note 8.
137. See Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep Up with Tech-
nological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239 (2007) (demonstrating how law lags be-
hind innovation and technology advancements).
138. Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized 
Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191, 202 (2016).
139. See supra note 8, as “law lag” or “legal lag” are terms that were frequently used in law 
and technology literature.
140. See, e.g., Rob Frieden, Regulatory Arbitrage Strategies and Tactics in Telecommunica-
tions, 5 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 227, 271 (2004) (stating that “[t]oo many regulatory asymmetries remain 
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Court explained in Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, a regulatory lag is a 
delay between a change in certain market conditions, production technologies, 
or innovations, and the modification and updating of laws that are founded on 
those factors.141
This Article focuses on the delay that takes place from the first appearance 
of a regulable activity and until effective regulation is initiated as RegLag, a 
term similar to the ‘law lag’ concept, but more inclusive.142 This Article argues, 
however, that RegTech, and in particular, technology-enabled anticipatory ap-
proaches, can help reduce RegLag, which is considered a source of regulatory 
inefficiency,143 by modifying the types of regulable activities. 
RegLag can offer private actors incentives that take one of two forms: the 
possibility to earn more profits, or the threat of reduced earnings or losses, if the 
in place even though the public policy justifications no longer make sense. Regulatory lag or inertia 
accounts for some of the delay, but it also appears that stakeholders, particularly beneficiaries of 
regulatory asymmetries, successfully argue against change.”).
141. See Verizon Comms. Inc., et al. v. Fed. Comms. Comm’n et al., 535 U.S. 467, 505–506, 
560 (2002).
142. ‘Law lag’ or ‘legal lag’ are phrases that have been used in law and technology literature 
in connection with situations in which “existing legal provisions are inadequate to deal with a so-
cial, cultural or commercial context created by rapid advances in information and communication 
technology.” See Jeremy Pitt & Ada Diaconescu, The Algorithmic Governance of Common-Pool 
Resources, in FROM BITCOIN TO BURNING MAN AND BEYOND: THE QUEST FOR IDENTITY AND
AUTONOMY IN A DIGITAL SOCIETY 130, 137–38 (John H. Clippinger & David Bollier eds., 2014); 
Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger Tech-
nology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191, 202 (2016) (explaining law lag in the 
context of distributed ledger technology and its regulation); Thomas R. McLean, The Offshoring of 
American Medicine: Scope, Economic Issues and Legal Liabilities, 14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 205, 254 
(2005) (discussing things that tend to limit the legal lag time associated with telemedicine technolo-
gy and usages); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Cybertorts and Legal Lag: An Empirical 
Analysis, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 77, 77–78 (2003) (showcasing how Richard Nixon, in 1936, 
reflected on how within one generation, automobile liability law became so developed that the size 
of a comprehensive review grew from a few-page document to an entire encyclopedia); Michael L. 
Rustad & Maria Vittoria Onufrio, The Exportability of the Principles of Software: Lost in Transla-
tion, 2 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 25, 29 (2010) (demonstrating how “[i]n the case of software 
law, there has been a forty-year ‘legal lag’ between the rises of software as a separate industry and 
the development of specialized contracting principles.”). Somewhat relatedly, discussing how and 
theorizing which norms will shape the future of public administration, the solution-driven Silicon 
Valley technologies, or the culture of justification of public law jurists. See also Paul Daly, Artifi-
cial Administration: Administrative Law in the Age of Machines 1, 2 (Ottawa Faculty of Law, 
Working Paper No. 2020-03, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=349338. In this Article we focus on 
“RegTech,” which is similar to ‘law lag,’ or ‘legal lag’, but broader as does not specifically refer to 
circumstances in which the lag results from technologically-driven changes, but generally to situa-
tions in which new regulation is needed to address new types of “wrongs” or new should-be-
regulable types of activities. ‘Law lag’ or ‘legal lag’ in that sense, are terms that closely follow the
understanding that “[l]aw lags science; it does not lead it.” See, e.g., Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 
F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996); Sanderson v. Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981, 
1003 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
143. See Pitt & Diaconescu, id.
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regulators adjust the prices downward.144 Therefore, RegLag is typically the 
result of active gaming by potentially regulated entities to intentionally avoid,
skirt or frustrate regulation; especially given the notoriously slow administrative 
rule-making processes, which result in a lag145 as “agile private actors” adjust to 
the rules and avoid sanctions when the administration does eventually update its 
regulation. Therefore, the pace of economic change makes regulatory effec-
tiveness become decreasingly feasible with increased RegLag.146 But, this Arti-
cle argues that technology can assist in reducing RegLag, making markets more 
efficient and responsive to change by accurately imbedding new data into sup-
ply, demand, volume and market clearance prices. Technology has also pro-
pelled markets to higher transaction velocity, sometimes instantaneous clear-
ance, growing transaction volumes particularly when adjusted per capita, and 
may be the most important contributor to increased variety in goods and ser-
vices. Arguably, regulator inspired RegTech has driven much efficiency in fi-
nancial markets.
Still, technology-induced progress and refinement in regulation remain rela-
tively under-utilized resources. Regulators are chronically behind-the-curve in 
deploying information, computer and tele-communications technologies. Fur-
thermore, whatever countermeasures were formerly effective to channel unde-
sirable or prohibited activities eventually become obsolete. Also, business prac-
tice innovation complicates the short useful life of regulatory control 
mechanisms. Regulated entities often target the circumvention of existing regu-
latory measures, which enable such private actors to outmaneuver regulators.147
Thus, the business practice discovery and countermeasure development are a cat 
and a mouse cycle that many regulatory agencies should acknowledge to inform 
development of effective countermeasures.148
144. Kurt A. Strasser, Bonus and Penalty Plans to Improve Public Utility Performance: Les-
sons from the Cases, 19 CONN. L. REV. 513, 521 (1987).
145. Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons,
82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 240–41 (2011).
146. The term RegLag is conventional empathy with rate regulated industries, e.g., public 
utilities. RegLag is the hypothetical loss produced by episodic rate-making proceedings. Regulated 
entities are locked-in to rates of return determined at periodic proceedings then become unable to 
maintain the awarded “fair rate of return” during periods of cost inflation (e.g., energy, labor, fi-
nancing). See, e.g., Thompson, H.E. and Thatcher, L.W., Required Rate of Return for Equity Capi-
tal Under Conditions of Growth and Consideration of Regulatory Lag, 49 LAND ECON. (1973). In 
this paper, regulatory lag is similar but broader. The delay in regulatory responsiveness is broader 
and not tied solely to the fixed periodic reconsideration regulated pricing (rates) but extends to regu-
lator delay in all its activities.
147. David Skeel, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 157 (2011).
148. See, e.g., Jason Tashea, Cat-and-mouse game: Customers demand cybersecurity, law 
enforcement wants easier access to evidence, AM. BAR J. (Oct.1, 2018) https://www.abajournal.com
/magazine/article/cybersecurity_law_enforcement_access (arguing technological advances respon-
sive to customer privacy demand frustrates law enforcement investigatory tools); see also
CLARENCE CHIO AND DAVID FREEMAN, MACHINE LEARNING AND SECURITY: PROTECTING 
SYSTEMS WITH DATA AND ALGORITHMS (2018); Danny McPherson, Cybercrime–A game of cat and 
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As applied to FinTech, this Article argues that RegLag occurs when innova-
tions in business practices develop and deploy long before regulators can afford 
investigation or develop useful understanding. RegLag delays compromise ef-
fective counter-measure development. Innovation in government activities is 
narrowly directed, even when it behaves at its most robust. There are far fewer 
actively funded, encouraged and rewarded regulatory agency efforts, particular-
ly when compared with investment in the broader array of private sectors.149
Nevertheless, technology is double-edged: while it shows promise to reduce 
RegLag, technology also creates friction that can increase RegLag delays. Most 
technical innovations in the private sector cause RegLag as evidenced by de-
layed and reactionary public policy response from frictions in: (i) phenomena 
discovery, (ii) theorizing, (iii) development and interpretation of control mecha-
nism alternatives, (iv) assessment of control mechanism efficacy, and (v) de-
ployment of these regulatory mechanisms to adjust rights, duties and opportuni-
ties. A great example for this is blockchain regulation, which has externalities 
that “are destined to experience regulatory lag. Nevertheless, it remains possi-
ble that this lag can be reduced as regulators and policymakers expend re-
sources and creative intelligence to better understand, address, and resolve 
blockchain characteristics.”150
1. Regulatory Arbitrage Contributes to RegLag
RegLag also suffers from the regulatory arbitrage phenomenon.151 When 
economic actors perceive strict control looms large in one market or for one 
transactional configuration, there is a natural tendency to reconfigure their ac-
tivity in some other form that avoids classification in a regulated form.152 There 
mouse in 2009, 2 NETWORK SECURITY 15–18 (2010); Aron Laszka et al., A survey of interdepend-
ent information security games, 47 ACM COMP. SURVEYS 1–38 (2014), https://dl.acm.org
/doi/pdf/10.1145/2635673.
149. Public goods are most likely to attract financial support in government-inspired innova-
tion programs, including government funded research. See, e.g., Joshua R. Bruce, & John M. de 
Figueiredo, Innovation in the U.S. Government, Duke L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Series No. 
2020-30 (2020) (reviewing federally funded research and development including resulting patenting 
activity; arguing federal funding concentrates in technological, organizational, regulatory, and poli-
cy realms, noting a majority of the 200,000 federal government scientists work at DoD, DoE and 
NASA in physical science and engineering; and that other agencies’ patented innovation is heavily 
weighted toward mathematics, social sciences, and data analytics).
150. John W. Bagby et. al., An Emerging Political Economy of the Blockchain: Enhancing 
Regulatory Opportunities, 88 UMKC L. REV. 419, 474 (2019).
151. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Regulatory Arbitrage, and Limits, 20 EUR. BUS. ORG. L.
REV. 567 (2019) (discussing the phenomenon of regulatory arbitrage); Annelise Riles, Managing 
Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 47 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 63 (2014).
152. Regulatory arbitrage exists as a side effect in many disciplines under various names, in-
cluding balloon effect and regulatory displacement. The balloon metaphor is vividly obvious, seen 
when gas escapes from a balloon’s flattened zone (regulated zone) of a gas-filled balloon spreads in 
other directions to displace to other parts of the balloon. This dramatic image illustrates the general 
concept of a substitution effect that recognizes that barriers imposed to certain activities leave only 
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is a substitution effect when scarcity impacts markets for one type of good or 
service. Increases in (regulatory compliance) costs for one product or service 
configuration induces producers to supply unregulated substitutes. Producers
and consumers explore alternative products or services that serve similar pur-
poses. Measures of economic utility are explored that ostensibly approximate 
satisfaction of product or service features. As regulation is seen to constrain 
some form of activity, demand (or supply) migrates to these substitutes.
RegLag materializes from those who intentionally configure their activity to 
create alternative designs, at least in part, to avoid regulation. When a novel 
and currently unregulated transaction, product or service structure is deployed, 
it inhibits regulatory response. Regulators can suffer jurisdiction confusion and 
can be ham-strung by narrow, legacy definitions of regulable activities. Fur-
ther, well-organized regulated industry groups regularly exert influence to en-
courage hands-off restraint: directly on regulators and indirectly through regula-
tors’ watchdogs—judicial review, legislative oversight and funding and policy 
influence from the executive branch.
Financial market regulation may be the paradigm of regulatory arbitrage 
and its contribution to RegLag. Consider the exemplar of CFTC vs. SEC juris-
diction over derivatives: there are powerful constituents (both regulated entities 
and affected parties) under each agency, these two quasi-independent agencies 
are generally disincentivized towards coordination, and financial innovation oc-
curs world-wide incentivizing evasion of national or sectoral regulation.153
Similarly, consider the exemplar of the regulatory arbitrage that exploits the 
“loophole” associated with the industrial loan corporations (ILCs)—state level 
chartered depository institutions that are not regulated as banks, but still have 
access to federal deposit insurance under the FDIC.154
(sometimes) less desirable alternatives, nevertheless economic actors migrate to the next, most ef-
fortless course of action. The balloon effect is controversial in policy analysis of drug enforcement, 
see generally, Betsy Marsh, Going to Extremes. The U.S.-Funded Aerial Eradication Program in 
Colombia, Report, The Latin America Working Group Education Fund, Washington DC (March 
2004) at 8 (arguing balloon effect accurately describes eradication of drug cultivation as a form of 
displacement); but c.f., Cornelius Friesendorf, Squeezing the Balloon, United States Air Interdiction 
and the Restructuring of the Southern American Drug Industry in the 1990s, 44 Crime, L.& Soc. 
Crime 35–78 at 36, 39, 40, 52 (2005) (arguing the balloon effect metaphor could be misleading as a 
mono-causal model of displacement), accessible at: https://link.springer.com/content
/pdf/10.1007/s10611-006-9005-9.pdf. See also, Phillips, Richard, Sophisticated Financial Engineer-
ing and Tax Arbitrage, Combating Fiscal Fraud and Empowering Regulators at 36, 325, accessible 
at: https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/47105/9780198854722.pdf.
153. See, e.g., Edward J. Kane, Regulatory Structure in Futures Markets: Jurisdictional 
Competition Between the SEC, the CFTC, and Other Agencies, 4 J. FUTURES MKTS. 367 (1984); 
John D. Benson, Ending the Turf Wars: Support for a CFTC/SEC Consolidation, 36 VILL. L. REV.
1175 (1991); Timothy G. Massad, It’s Time to Strengthen the Regulation of Crypto-Assets 29–33 
(Brookings Inst., Working Paper, 2019) https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads
/2019/03/Timothy-Massad-Its-Time-to-Strengthen-the-Regulation-of-Crypto-Assets-2.pdf.
154. Marc Hochstein, A Quick Guide to What’s at Stake in The Sofi Charter Controversy,
AM. BANKER. (July 25, 2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/slideshow/a-quick-guide-to-whats-
at-stake-in-the-sofi-charter-controversy.
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Coordinated response among competing regulators may serve as a possible 
countermeasure to regulatory arbitrage, although this may become less effective 
as regulated entities cheat. Of course, a federal solution can blunt regulatory 
arbitrage. Central governments can address non-uniformity among provincial 
governments; this is particularly effective when the regulable activity impacts 
multiple regions. International regulatory cooperation is a weak form of feder-
alization that can minimize such spillover.
IV. A SOLUTION TO REGLAG: ANTICIPATORY REGTECH MODEL
RegTech compliance deployments generally accumulate piecemeal. Some 
RegTech systems are quickly retired or are decommissioned if they fail (mostly) 
unspecified effectiveness standards imposed by the deploying regulated enti-
ties.155 It is unclear whether the work of independent auditors sampling and 
testing, or confirmation of public disclosure accuracy inform anyone inside or 
outside regulated entities on the efficacy of RegTech compliance methods.
Regulated entities’ deployments of RegTech in their compliance systems are 
not uniformly disclosed to regulators nor in mandatory financial disclosures.156
Predictions based on selective samples,157 like that presented here, may provide 
the best initial analysis useful in developing an anticipatory model to divine 
155. RegTech efficacy testing is only indirectly imposed by regulatory agencies. For example, 
investigations and enforcement against non-compliance is an indirect validation method for compli-
ance RegTech. As enforcement experience grows at regulatory agencies, piecemeal standards could 
develop.
156. Some reporting companies may discuss their RegTech compliance efforts in their quar-
terly and annual reports, in IPO documents (prospectus) when issuing new securities, in proxy solic-
itation information statements, in offering disclosures required for various exempt offerings, or in 
the “white papers” typical to initial coin offerings (ICO). When independent audits are required, 
auditors would likely be required to verify these disclosures if/when encountered. However, Reg-
Tech costs or savings may fail the materiality disclosure threshold, undermining both disclosure and 
review. Furthermore, the trend in SEC reporting for non-financial matters in Regulation S-K is to 
“de-dupe” certain details and simplify compliance, see, e.g., SECH. EXCH. COMM’N., Release No. 
10750: Management’s Discussion and Analysis, Selected Financial Data, and Supplementary Fi-
nancial Information (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2020/33-10750.pdf (pro-
posing to remove and reserve two Regulation S-K disclosure requirements, Item 301, 17 C.F.R. §
229.301 and Item 302, 17 C.F.R. § 229.302 as well as simplifying Item 303, Management Discus-
sion and Analysis (MD&A)), 17 C.F.R.§ 229.303); SEC. EXCH. COMM’N., Release No. 10668:
Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105 (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.sec.gov
/rules/proposed/2019/33-10668.pdf (proposing changes in several descriptive items of issuer busi-
ness operations and legal proceedings). The MD&A is a logical home for any narrative discussion 
of RegTech initiatives or its performance. Furthermore, the Reg. S-K Item 103 Legal Proceedings 
might be another location for this discussion. Both locations are limited by materiality and litigation 
disclosure is generally episodic while compliance is continuous.
157. See, e.g., English, Stacey & Susannah Hammond, Fintech, Regtech and the Role of 
Compliance, THOMSON REUTERS (Jan. 17, 2018) https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/content
/dam/ewp-m/documents/legal/en/pdf/reports/fintech-regtech-and-the-role-of-compliance-2017.pdf 
(reporting survey results on RegTech by regulated entities).
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RegTech needs, deployments and success.158 Many of these data are proprie-
tary and likely to remain confidential unless voluntarily disclosed or mandatory 
disclosures emerge under requirements of some regulatory program deeming 
RegTech compliance transparency essential. That day has not yet arrived. In-
deed, regulated entities that believe their RegTech compliance efforts constitute 
competitive advantage are the least likely groups to forthrightly reveal such 
matters. After all, there is no reason to share what could constitute trade se-
crets, unless there is a legal requirement to do so or it is otherwise believed that 
disclosure holds some strategic advantage.159 Likewise, as to the RegTech de-
ployments, data on costs, effectiveness analysis, and generalizability to other 
regulatory programs, is poorly retained or studied, which makes developing 
successful anticipatory models more challenging.
Our legal system must mandate and help enable better transparency such 
that RegTech progress is accelerated and diffused. Nevertheless, regulatory 
agency deployments of RegTech constitute a voluminous record such that any 
complete catalog remains currently infeasible.160
A. Addressing the Technology Diffusion Lag–Equalizing the Playing Field
Innovative RegTech systems, as promising as they may be, can take very 
long to prove useful once deployed, or show up in productivity statistics.161
Part of the reason for that is “technology diffusion lag”—a delay between the 
time a new technology is introduced and how long it takes for it to become 
widely adopted.162 It can take a long time for a new technology or innovative 
system to be successfully deployed and replace an existing one.163 And while 
many sectors such as health care, education, energy, and public safety suffer 
158. See, e.g., GOVERNMENT TRENDS 2020, Center for Government Insight, Deloitte Consult-
ing (2020), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/government-trends-2020
/DI_Government-Trends-2020.pdf (arguing that potentially regulable problems can be preempted 
with predictive analytics that anticipate business practices).
159. Of course, vendors of RegTech compliance systems diminish any such competitive ad-
vantage when off-the-shelf compliance systems are marketed to large swaths of regulated entities on 
a non-discriminatory basis. Nevertheless, a competitive advantage might be perceived when Reg-
Tech “solutions” are either developed in-house or purpose-built by independent service organiza-
tions (ISO) under contracts restricting vendor resale to other clients. In these latter two cases, Reg-
Tech compliance “solutions” could constitute protectable IP, see, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 
U.S. 281 (1979) (holding disclosed information was not confidential in reverse-FOIA case).
160. See Bagby & Reitter, Anticipatory FinTech Regulation, supra note 33 (chronicling his-
torical accretion of FinTech innovations by regulators and SROs, the regulator RegTech innova-
tions).
161. FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, Connecting America: The Nat’l Broadband Plan, 2010 WL 
972375, at *176 (Mar. 16, 2010).
162. “The final stage of the cycle is diffusion—the technology’s widespread adoption.” Gaia 
Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2257, 2272 (2010).
163. For more on this, see Rody E. Manuelli & Ananth Seshadri, Frictionless Technology 
Diffusion: The Case of Tractors (April 2003 NBER Working Paper No. w9604),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=392991.
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more from technology diffusion lags—particularly because our twenty first cen-
tury economy is moving from analog to digital—the public sector is especially 
behind in adapting its systems to take advantage of the information technology 
era.164 Regulators and government agencies suffer much more from the tech-
nology diffusion lag than private industry players.165
To improve regulatory agency clairvoyance and enable regulators to devel-
op successful anticipatory RegTech models, the playing field must be levelled 
and equalized. This can be done if regulators focus on addressing the following 
issues. First, regulators must be willing to pay the upfront costs of replacing 
and updating their technological infrastructure to successfully attract and hire 
young and talented employees that are qualified to compete with current private 
sector computing standards.166 Second, regulators cannot involve themselves as 
participants in the information and data collection and sharing wars that take 
place in the private sector. Therefore, the government can and should drive in-
novation in the private sector like it has in the past,167 but must figure out how 
to feed data back into its system and improve its standard protocol for onboard-
ing new technology. Likewise, regulating agencies must improve the protocols 
regarding getting services of outside contractors,168 including not necessarily 
rehiring contractors who did not adhere to standards in the past, even if it means 
not working just with “experienced” contractors.169 Slow bureaucratic process-
es and the preference for massive purchases also typify the disconnect between 
the federal government and the private sector.170 For instance, the U.S. Citizen-
ship and Immigration Services (USCIS) dedicated years to update its systems 
164. Id.
165. Jack Corrigan, The Government’s Struggle to Hire Young Tech Talent is Worse Than 
You Thought, NextGov, (Dec. 1, 2017), at https://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2017/12
/governments-struggle-hire-young-tech-talent-worse-you-thought/144225/.
166. Id. (explaining that according to the U.S. Office of Personnel Management’s federal 
workforce data, in 2017, for every IT employee under 30 years old, there were 4.5 over 60).
167. See Rana Foroohar, Why You Can Thank the Government for Your iPhone, TIME (Oct. 
27, 2015, 2:11 PM), https://time.com/4089171/mariana-mazzucato/.
168. For some discussion on what this entails see Rick Douglas Humphress, The Contractor 
Shadow Government: A Literature Review (April 7, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3268125 (re-
viewing the role of private contractors in conducting America’s public business); Charles Tiefer, 
Restrain “Risky Business”: Treat High-Risk Private Security Contractors as Inherently Govern-
mental, 50 HARV. J. LEGIS. 209 (2013).
169. For instance, even though Oracle was not successful in launching HealthCare.gov in 
2013, it still received from the federal government millions of federal dollars per year after that 
happened. See, e.g., Han Schank & Sara Hudson, Hawaii’s false alert shows the sorry state of gov-
ernment technology, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2018, 1:03 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/outlook/hawaiis-false-alert-shows-the-sorry-state-of-government-technology/2018/01/19/59486fa2-
fbcb-11e7-a46b-a3614530bd87_story.html.
170. For an example of this, see Jared Serbu, Why DoD May Have Given Amazon Every Rea-
son To Protest JEDI, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Dec. 18, 2019, 9:06 AM), https://federalnews
network.com/defense-main/2019/12/why-dod-may-have-given-amazon-every-reason-to-protest-
jedi/ (discussing, inter alia, the slow DoD procurement process that can drag on for years, and how 
the deployment of critical technology is thus delayed).
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and digitize its immigration forms, and by the time the new platforms was 
launched, it was already outdated.171 Third, the gap between the technological 
abilities of regulators and those of the private sector is likely to widen unless 
efforts such as the initiation of the Modernizing Government Technology Act of 
2017 (MGT Act)172 continue, and enable the government to move towards more 
easily adopting technologies and improving cybersecurity measures.173
1. The Black Box Problem
Even if cultural and business obstacles can be overcome, regulatory failure 
to completely understand how certain technologies work or calculate results—
as some RegTech tools operate in a “black box” like fashion—may present dif-
ficulties.174 Specifically, AI, machine learning, and predictive analytics are 
tools that involve complex applications of data science on massive amounts of 
sometimes random data sets, frequently in dynamic ways. Since it would be 
almost impossible for regulators to understand and even audit some RegTech 
tools or results, they might be reluctant to adopt such RegTech anticipatory 
tools or deploy them for regulatory purposes, like when dealing with internal 
models for risk-weighting or stress testing.175 For regulators to get comfortable 
171. See Schank & Hudson, supra note 169.
172. H.R. 2227, 115th Cong. (2017). See H.R. REP NO. 115-129, pt. 1, at 10 (2017) (“[The 
MGT Act] is intended to build on FITARA and empower and hold accountable covered agency 
[chief information officers] to pursue IT modernization.”). The MGT Act was meant to create new 
budget accounts to fund efforts to modernize regulators’ IT systems. Id. at 1–2. The need to mod-
ernize technology and make it more cost effective while also improving its ability to protect infor-
mation security was raised many times in congressional hearings. See, e.g., Federal Agencies’ Reli-
ance on Outdated and Unsupported Information Technology: A Ticking Time Bomb: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 1 (2016). Similarly, State Repre-
sentatives specifically stated how regulators’ budget cuts minimize the funds that government agen-
cies get to spend on system upgrades, hiring, and talent retention that are key to the regulators’ abil-
ity to update outdated information systems. Id. at 4.
173. See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB M-18-12, 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MODERNIZING GOVERNMENT TECHNOLOGY ACT (2018), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/M-18-12.pdf.
174. Nizan Geslevich Packin, Consumer Finance and AI: The Death of Second Opinions?, 22 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y. 319, 357–58 (2020) (explaining that “[m]achine-learning algo-
rithms are known for being extremely accurate, but this precision comes with an interpretive cost, 
which is the reason such algorithms have been referred to as ‘black box’ systems. . . Machine-
learning algorithms turn a series of inputs to a series of outputs by perfecting a performance criteri-
on, however, that is the maximum that analysts are capable of understanding in terms of the algo-
rithms actions. Algorithmic users are not truly able to tell which particular relationships between 
variables factor into the algorithm’s categorization, or at which stage. Similarly, algorithmic users 
also cannot ‘establish how exactly the algorithm puts together different associations to yield its cat-
egorizations.’ Hence, the ‘black box’ metaphor . . . .”).
175. See INST. OF INT’L FIN., REGTECH IN FINANCIAL SERVICES: TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS 
FOR COMPLIANCE AND REPORTING 1 (2016).
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with these tools, they will need to be confident that the models do what they are 
“supposed” to do, and that outputs can be trusted.176 
As mentioned above, this Article seeks to enable better transparency such 
that RegTech progress is accelerated and diffused.  To do that we must equalize 
the technology diffusion lag playing field between the private and the public 
sector, and help regulators be able to enjoy the possible benefits of anticipatory 
technology. 
2. Anticipating RegTech Deployment at Regulatory Agencies 
Despite the opacity and slowness of RegTech developments at regulatory 
agencies or the opaqueness of RegTech developments at regulated entities, 
some clairvoyance seems possible.  Research can develop inventories of Reg-
Tech information from various sources.  For example, regulatory agencies 
charged with developing regulatory effectiveness expertise and comparative an-
alytics among a broad range of regulatory programs are obvious sources.  The 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and its constituent unit, the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) already conduct coordination 
among non-independent agencies (cabinet level), critique cost-benefit analysis 
of major rules177 and coordinate each agency’s policy conformance with Execu-
tive branch policy directives.178  Retrospective confirmation of existing rule ef-
ficacy also supplies additional RegTech effectiveness information.179 
Regulatory agency plans to mechanize regulatory program elements are 
likely evident on their records.  Few government agencies experience much 
wild growth or prosperous times as was once believed they did, such as during 
the New Deal.  Agency budgets and authorities are targeted for reduction by 
libertarians, foes of big government and budget conscious policy advocates. 
Therefore, it may be challenging for agency personnel advocating RegTech to 
win cost-benefit arguments for such investments. 
B. Anticipatory RegTech in Financial Services Regulation 
Consider the financial services industry.  There are numerous regulatory 
agencies both deploying RegTech innovations or confronting compliance Reg-
Tech “solutions” from regulated entities.  Overcoming the cost-benefit case 
against such public expenditure may require the development of big data con-
 
 176. Jonah M.A. Crane, RegTech: Bending the Risk/Cost Curve or Breaking It?, 20 No. 4 
FINTECH L. REP. NL 2, 5 (2017). 
 177. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981); John Watson Bagby, Regulatory 
Impact Analyses: Towards a Reasonable Economic Impact from Federal Regulations, 19 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 533–550 (1984). 
 178. See Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. § 323 (1985). 
 179. See Exec. Order No. 13,610, 77 Fed. Reg. 18,467 (May 14, 2012). 
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sortia, inter-state coordination,180 specialization by particular agencies, and data 
sharing among many if not all regulatory authorities.181 First, in the U.S. there 
are fifty state banking regulators, fifty state blue sky securities regulators, fifty 
state attorneys general (AG), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC), the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Comptroller of 
the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Na-
tional Credit Union Administration (NCUA), among others. Second, there are 
additional suppliers, users and hosts of such data including non-governmental 
entities like the various self-regulatory organizations (SRO), the trading plat-
forms and exchanges, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), state 
bar associations and accounting regulators and societies. State regulation of 
money service/transmitter businesses (MSB) is not uniformly overseen by each 
state’s bank regulators and is sometimes the domain of other state agencies.182
Third, international regulators add additional layers of non-standardization or 
cooperation but may also impose data sharing and enforcement barriers. Given 
the RegTech leadership that Europe and some Asian nations have displayed,183
the move toward a more uniform approach that minimizes regulatory arbitrage 
might better attain regulatory objectives while controlling costs.184
C. SEC’s FinHub Anticipatory RegTech
Since 2018, the Strategic Hub for Innovation and Financial Technology 
(FinHub) has inspired a forecasting of RegTech at the SEC. FinHub provides a 
180. See generally, CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS & MONEY TRANSMITTERS REGUL.
ASS’N, THE STATE OF STATE MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES REGULATION & SUPERVISION 1 (2016) 
(exemplifying inter-state coordination).
181. National Association of States’ Attorneys General (NAAG) share data, coordinate multi-
state investigations and enforcement and share analysis.
182. See generally Interactive Map of US State Financial Regulators, FAISALKHAN.COM
(Nov. 11, 2020), https://faisalkhan.com/services/money-transfer-license-money-transmitter-license
/us-money-transmitter-license/list-of-money-services-businesses-msb-license-regulators/.
183. See Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., Fintech Toolkit: Smart Regulatory and Market Approaches 
to Financial Technology Innovation (Univ. of H.K. Research Paper No. 2020/027, 2020) (advocat-
ing seven principles of FinTech regulatory approaches).
184. An important factor regarding regulatory expectations is the need for consistency of ap-
proach across borders. Multiple memoranda of understanding have been agreed upon by regulators, 
while organization like the Global Financial Innovation Network (GFIN) have been established to 
facilitate the engagement among companies and regulators and establish a framework for partner-
ship and cooperation among the different regulators themselves. GLOBAL FINANCIAL INNOVATION 
NETWORK, GFIN – ONE YEAR ON 10 (2019) (“As the pace of technological change increases it re-
quires regulators to adapt to a new landscape and devise new ways of working together. There are 
still many areas to look at and in many ways our work is just beginning. We expect future challeng-
es to include understanding and working with data privacy and data-sharing requirements across 
many jurisdictions and regulators.”).
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portal for the FinTech activities conducted by various SEC divisions and offic-
es185 as:
“[A] central point of focus for our efforts to monitor and engage on innovations in 
the securities markets that hold promise, but which also require a flexible, prompt 
regulatory response.”
186
FinHub engages in forecasting the emergence and potential regulation of 
blockchain/distributed ledger, cryptocurrencies, automated investment tools ad 
robo-advisers, digital marketplace financing (e.g., crowdfunding), and artificial 
intelligence/machine learning. One RegTech example targeting ICO applies the 
longstanding Howey framework to ICO in the SEC’s Framework for ‘Invest-
ment Contract’ Analysis of Digital Assets.187
Big data must play an increasing RegTech role because AI deployment re-
quires large data sets to reason, link or make discoveries using pattern analysis.
AI deployment is increasingly noted throughout government and across regula-
tory programs.188 There is very extensive AI use in the intelligence community 
(IC). AI-enabled automated detection in enforcement189 depends on big data.190
The National Market System’s Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT - NMS) is a 
comprehensive data reporting and retention system of all reportable events to be 
electronically filed by SROs with the central repository, the Securities Industry 
Automation Corporation (SIAC), a NYSE Euronext subsidiary. The CAT-NMS 
should allow regulators to track all activity efficiently and accurately through-
out U.S. markets trading National Market System (NMS) securities. These ac-
tivities include identity of members associated with all quote and order related 
instances, such as origination, modification, cancellation, routing, and execu-
tion.
Additional SEC anticipatory RegTech efforts include various activities of 
the SECs Distributed Ledger Technology Working Group, the SECs Center for 
Risk and Quantitative Analytics, the xBRL disclosure submission standardiza-
tion effort, and a “sources sought” RFP announcement seeking the provision of 
185. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Launches New Strategic Hub for Innovation 
and Financial Technology (Oct. 18, 2018).
186. Id.
187. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FRAMEWORK FOR “INVESTMENT CONTRACT” ANALYSIS OF 
DIGITAL ASSETS 1 (2019).
188. See, e.g., DAVID FREEDMAN ENGSTROM ET AL., GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM:
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (2020); see also DAVID 
FREEDMAN ENGSTROM ET AL., APPENDIX—GOVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (2020) (documenting data underlying re-
port on AI use at various regulatory agencies).
189. Jerry Arnold, Automated Detection in SEC Enforcement, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 
FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (May 31, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu
/2014/05/31/automated-detection-in-sec-enforcement/.
190. See Scott W. Bauguess, Acting Dir. and Acting Chief Economist, Div. of Econ. And 
Risk Analysis, The Role of Big Data, Machine Learning, and AI in Assessing Risks: a Regulatory 
Perspective (June 21, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/bauguess-big-data-ai.
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data for the “most widely used” blockchain ledgers based on transaction vol-
ume, in order to “monitor risk and improve compliance” related to cryptocur-
rencies.191 The SEC will require data in an “easily reviewable” format, along 
with an overview of how the information is extracted and converted to ensure 
“there is no loss in data completeness and accuracy due to the data transfor-
mation tools and processes applied.” Notably, the SEC is seeking to identify 
transaction details among “the universe of available information.” The SEC al-
so seeks to deploy a Plain English approach to cryptocurrencies and BlockChain 
language given a general misunderstanding of the varying esoterica used in ICO 
white papers and related documents.192 The SEC is undertaking anticipatory 
RegTech regulatory approaches consistent with the anticipatory model recom-
mended here.
1. Federal Reserve Anticipatory RegTech Experience
The Federal Reserve System is actively involved in collecting economic da-
ta, formatting it in standard ways to inform the Federal Reserve Board (Board) 
for its decision-making. Such data underlie working papers, notes, data compi-
lations, international finance discussion papers, and several other categories of 
published data and analysis by the Board’s staff and by member regional Feder-
al Reserve Banks. These cover many financial system topics driving the Fed’s 
anticipation of regulable activities from innovation in the banking industry.
These include the payment system, currencies, monetary policies, consumer 
protection needs, financial system stability, supervision and general regulation 
of financial institutions.
There is some specialization in regional Federal Reserve Bank publications;
these member banks are owned by member commercial banks so research that 
informs RegTech and big data are financed off-the-books of the federal gov-
ernment. For example, forecasting crypto regulatory arbitrage adaptations to 
avoid regulation is inextricably tied to anti-money laundering (AML) enforce-
ment, among the most enduring of RegTech applications. The COVID-19 pan-
demic accelerates electronic payment demand.193 However, most cryptocurren-
cies remain unlikely to meet that demand because crypto generally behaves like 
highly volatile commodities, sometimes perhaps as securities, thereby missing 
the mark as stable currencies.194
191. Blockchain Data, SEC Sources Sought No. 50310219Q0041 (Jan, 31, 2019), 
http://www.fbodaily.com/archive/2019/02-February/02-Feb-2019/FBO-05208153.htm.
192. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FRAMEWORK FOR “INVESTMENT CONTRACT” ANALYSIS OF 
DIGITAL ASSETS (April 3, 2019) https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-
analysis-digital-assets.
193. See, e.g., Juergen Braunstein, Marion Laboure & Sachin Silva, COVID-19 Pandemic 
Accelerates the Rise of Digital Payments, THE ECONOMIST: PERSPECTIVES (Mar. 20, 2020), 
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets.
194. See generally Bagby et al., An Emerging Political Economy, supra note 150, at 452–53 
(arguing many, if not most ICO, constitute an initial offering of securities under the Howey defini-
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2. CFPB’s Anticipatory RegTech
The CFPB was greatly scrutinized in 2020 by the U.S. Supreme Court. It 
has been actively involved in recent years in collecting financial data and for-
matting it in standard ways to inform its different divisions for their decision-
making and consumer protection efforts. In fact, according to the bureau’s pub-
lished Strategic Plan, Budget, And Performance Plan and Reports, the bureau 
has been “committed to staying on the leading edge of technology and leverag-
ing its technological resources to provide significant business value with lower 
costs. From developing online products that help inform consumers to making 
critical data available internally and to the public, technology is and will contin-
ue to be core to the CFPB accomplishing its mission.”195 Specifically, the 
CFPB has stated that it seeks to “[e]nhance the successful deployment of pro-
jects through the continued use of disciplined methodologies . . . and facilitate 
the development of the long-term technology strategy that guides future mission 
capabilities.”196 Similarly, the CFPB has declared that it will “[c]ontinue to 
build and develop a data-driven strategy that is deployed on a technology archi-
tecture with scalable capabilities that will allow the Bureau to use and manage 
data in order to conduct predictive analytics and aid in decision making.”197
Lastly, it explained that it will continue to strengthen its ability “to design, de-
velop, implement, and maintain new tools with enhanced capabilities, features, 
and functionalities for a variety of business applications that support the Bu-
reau’s mission.”198
Additionally, in 2020, the CFPB has launched Tech Sprints,199 an idea that 
the bureau borrowed from Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in the U.K.200
The Tech Sprints operate with the goal of bringing together “technologists with 
financial, consumer, and regulatory stakeholders for short, intense problem-
solving sessions.”201 By launching the Tech Sprints, the CFPB aims to 
“[d]evelop actionable technology-focused solutions to a variety of regulatory 
tion of an investment contract and promoters and their affiliates engage in unlawful acts preceding 
or during an ICO distribution).
195. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, THE CFPB STRATEGIC PLAN, BUDGET, AND 
PERFORMANCE PLAN AND REPORT 6, 77 (Feb. 2016), https://files.consumerfinance.gov
/f/201602_cfpb_report_strategic-plan-budget-and-performance-plan_FY2016.pdf (in the document 
the CFPB states that one of its goals is to “[e]nable the innovative use of technology for the benefit 
of efficient internal processes and effective public engagement.”).
196. Id. at 4–85.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Electronic Disclosures of Adverse Action Virtual Tech Sprint, CONSUMER FIN.
PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/innovation/cfpb-tech-sprints
/electronic-disclosures-tech-sprint/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
200. Steven Harras, CFPB Proposes ‘Tech Sprint’ Competitions To Foster Fintech Innova-
tion, CQ ROLL CALL WASH. BANKING BRIEFING, Sept. 18, 2019, 2019 WL 4460412.
201. Innovation at the Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumer
finance.gov/policy-compliance/innovation/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2021).
Spring 2021] RegTech and Predictive Lawmaking 165
and consumer protection challenges; [h]arness technology to reduce burden, 
improve results, and create greater efficiencies across financial markets; and 
[e]xplore how technology can reshape compliance and speed effective interac-
tion between regulators and financial institutions.”202 Specifically, the CFPB
“plans to design innovative electronic methods” for addressing some of its 
goals, which are reflected in laws such as the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
(ECOA) and/or the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), improving the accuracy 
of information used to take adverse action, and ever more importantly, antici-
pating discrimination on a prohibited basis and trying to better prevent it.203
3. RegTech Anticipates Market Manipulation
Balance is an elusive goal among various market influences. Atomized, re-
dundant, separate, and poorly-linked markets that trade similar or complemen-
tary goods and services, may retain some independence from each other despite 
their similarity. One benefit of such market isolation includes their autonomy 
from gyrations imposed by other markets. However, they suffer risk that their 
isolation deprives them of useful influences from markets trading similar assets.
Gyrations sound harmful while useful influences often seem important, particu-
larly if accurate signals spell efficiency from whatever source those signals em-
anate. Separated, independent markets probably serve mostly the interests that 
dominate each. Strong inter-market linkages likely connect all markets with a 
larger, louder, seemingly legitimate “guiding-hand,” thereby, representing the 
wisdom of bigger crowds. However, as globalization continues, advancements 
in the speed and spread of market influences, perhaps the ultimate achievement 
of a long overdue National Market System,204 suggest the isolation from auton-
omous parallel markets will continue to decline. Increasingly, this phenomenon 
is becoming evident in how market manipulation can be spread globally among 
markets. RegTech may be the silver-bullet sufficient to counter manipulation-
induced negative externalities.
Manipulation in markets for almost anything, currencies, commodities, fi-
nancial instruments, corporate control, and even the political marketplaces for 
ideas, likely share characteristics and intrusive mechanisms. RegTech can re-
veal trading patterns, identify manipulative scheme participants, isolate manipu-
lated venues (markets, platforms) and thereby inform regulatory enforcement 
with circumstantial evidence that “leads” further enforcement inquiry. Second 
to providing leads, the RegTech “twins” of big data and AI are likely to provide 
202. Id.
203. Electronic Disclosures of Adverse Action Virtual Tech Sprint, supra note 199.
204. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94–29, 89 Stat. 97; Regulation NMS, 
70 Fed. Reg. 124, 37496 (June 29, 2005); James L. Hamilton, Marketplace Organization and Mar-
ketability: NASDAQ, the Stock Exchange, and the National Market System, 33 J. FIN. 487 (1978); 
Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC’s National Market 
System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883 (1981); Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the 
SEC: The Failure of the National Market System,1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315 (1985).
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the basis for circumstantial evidence derived from inference, both statistical and 
causal.205 With some regulatory changes, disclosure enhancements, cyberspace 
security refinement and forensic watermarking, RegTech might even provide 
sources of direct evidence of manipulative intent and action.206
a. The Nature of Market Manipulation
Manipulation is unlawful under various theories: civil regulatory, tort-like 
private right of action and a criminal. Manipulation is mostly prohibited under 
the federal securities, commodities, and banking laws.207 Provisionally, consid-
er manipulation as acts intended to influence bid and ask postings, transaction 
closing prices, trading volumes and generally impact the general appearance of 
supply and demand. This can extend to the markets for registered or unregis-
tered securities, but also impacts commodities, currencies, and conceivably 
should extend to the market for services or the political marketplace for ide-
as.208 Of course, collusion among co-conspirators to set prices, constrain supply 
or otherwise manipulate markets is also an antitrust violation.209 Efforts to 
make political manipulation illegal are regularly and robustly suppressed by the 
very political forces habitually benefiting therefrom.210
Securities market experience with manipulation during the Roaring Twen-
ties perhaps made this market’s manipulation a primary target for suppression 
under the New Deal’s various Federal Securities Laws.211 Market integrity, the 
quality of embedding the wisdom of crowds who are motivated by their own 
“skin in the game,” is undermined by manipulation that compromises free-
market forces of supply and demand. Manipulation misleads or defrauds when 
intentional, by setting, stabilizing, raising or lowering price, as well as by false-
205. See, e.g., Beate Franke et al., Statistical Inference, Learning and Models in Big Data, 84 
INT’L STAT. REV. 371 (2016).
206. See, e.g., MATTHEW LIPPMAN, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (1st ed. 2016) (distinguishing crim-
inal prosecutorial use of circumstantial evidence as inferential, mediated by judges and weighted by 
juries from direct evidence resulting from observation).
207. See, e.g., Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
(1951); 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2010).
208. See generally, Eric Posner, The Law, Economics, and Psychology of Manipulation,
COASE-SANDOR WORKING PAPER SERIES L. AND ECON. No.726 (2015) (citing Sunsteins provision-
al definition as “controlling or playing upon someone by artful, unfair, or insidious means especially 
to one’s own advantage” noting the narrow policing yet broad generalization, well beyond market 
interference to include psychological manipulation, contractual manipulation). See also Cass R. 
Sunstein, Fifty Shades of Manipulation,1 J. MARKETING BEHAV. 213 (2016).
209. See generally Shaun D. Ledgerwood, James A. Keyte, Jeremy A. Verlinda, & Guy Ben-
Ishai, The Intersection of Market Manipulation Law And Monopolization Under The Sherman Act: 
Does It Make Economic Sense? 40 ENERGY L.J. 47 (2019) (comparing antitrust with Commodities 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) regulation of commodities manipulation).
210. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
211. See generally Frederick G. Kempin Jr., Jeremy L. Wiesen & John W. Bagby, LEGAL 
ASPECTS OF THE MANAGEMENT PROCESS 816–20 (4th ed. 1990); Adolph A. Berle, Stock Market 
Manipulation, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 393 (1938).
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ly communicating unmet, over-estimating or under-estimating, supply or de-
mand.
Manipulation is often perpetrated using a complex scheme not unlike mon-
ey-laundering,212 that disorients and exhausts detection efforts,213 particularly 
when composed of one or more transactions without economic substance.214 A
simple form of manipulation is a large, single trade that appears to boost supply 
or demand. A series of trades at rising or falling prices erects a façade of mar-
ket movement favoring (successive up pricing is bull raiding) or disfavoring 
(successive down prices is bear raiding) the targeted asset. Appearances can be 
enhanced using additional trading in derivatives or options in the underlying as-
set because derivative markets link to underlying asset market conditions.
There can be further false appearance of corroboration from well-timed rumors 
or news items, signaling innocent investors that they should imitate trading 
strategies. A useful illustration of such a well-timed rumors is Elon Musk’
tweeting about bitcoin and cryptocurrencies, which influenced many individuals 
and business to immediately invest in those as well.215 Another salient example 
of this is how social media and stock platforms allegedly assisted manipulative 
trading in the GameStop/RobinHood controversy in late January 2021.216 Pend-
ing the results of investigations by researchers, the media, and law enforcers as 
to what happened in the GameStop/RobinHood case, criminal conspiracy could 
very well be one explanation. Indeed, when well-coordinated, collusions may 
212. See generally, John W. Bagby, Protecting Critical Infrastructure through Effective Mon-
ey Laundering Enforcement, 8 CIP RPT. 6 (2010) (explaining that manipulation and money-
laundering share the features of complexity - a convoluted series of transactions that raise the costs 
of detection and enforcement because some components have the appearance of legitimate econom-
ic substance).
213. See generally, Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Stock 
Market Manipulation and its Regulation. 35 YALE J. REG. 67 (2018) (providing an analytical 
framework for securities market manipulation).
214. See generally, Barbara C. George & John W. Bagby, New Directions in the Architecture 
of Bribery: Expanded Prosecutions Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Intertwined with a 
Money Laundering Component (Manuscript #84) (Aug.13, 2011) (on file with the Academy of Le-
gal Studies in Business).
215. See, e.g., Micah Maidenberg, On Twitter, Elon Musk Has Mused About Bitcoin, WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 8, 2021, 4:51 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/on-twitter-elon-musk-has-mused-
about-bitcoin-11612821103 (discussing Elon Musk’s months long tweets and Tesla’s decision to 
buy bitcoin, and quoting Michael Saylor, founder and chief executive of a publicly traded company 
that has invested in bitcoin, explaining that “[i]f you want to do your shareholders a $100 billion 
favor, convert the [Tesla] balance sheet from [U.S. dollars to bitcoin]. Other firms on the S&P 500 
would follow your lead & in time it would grow to become a $1 trillion favor.”).
216. See, e.g., Jason Zweig, The Real Force Driving the GameStop Revolution, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 30, 2021, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-real-force-driving-the-gamestop-amc-
blackberry-revolution-11611965586 (explaining how “[t]housands of members of WallStreetBets, a 
forum at the online community reddit.com, have been leading the swarm of amateur individual trad-
ers buying stocks that hedge funds and other institutional investors were betting against . . . [while] 
thousands of small traders took to social media simultaneously to express outrage, demand redress 
and exhort each other to “HOLD THE LINE,” by not selling their shares.”).
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constitute criminal conspiracies. The quantum of damages rises as the larger 
sections of the targeted market takes its cues from these deceptive signals.
Larger scale manipulative schemes may deploy matched orders—the near 
simultaneous purchase and sale of similar size positions at near identical prices.
These are also known as “wash” sales because the risk of market losses is most-
ly cancelled out, or washed clean, except for transactions costs.217 Of course, 
certain legal hedging transactions use arbitrage that can resemble fictitious or-
ders.218 “Marking the close” are trades made above or below the last reported 
transaction, right at the cessation of trading, giving an overnight illusion of im-
pending price movement at the next market opening.219
Additional schemes include front-running, stabilization, hot issues and cor-
nering. The latter has been a common commodities manipulative scheme in 
which the manipulator seeks control over much of the deliverable supply or 
demand. The concept of squeezing the shorts recognizes that some sellers do 
not own what they have sold, intending to acquire the deliverable quantity later 
at lower prices in a falling market they expect will result.220 Corners manipu-
late supply forcing shorts to cover their positions at much inflated prices. Links 
between markets regulated by different regulatory agencies, such as links be-
tween the SEC regulated stock market and the CFTC regulated commodities 
markets (derivatives, indices, futures) take advantage of regulatory arbitrage, a 
lack of enforcement coordination among regulators responsible for different 
trenches of financial services.221
b. Could RegTech VIX an Emerging Manipulation Problem?
Market manipulation in financial assets generally depends on fundamentals, 
the conditions impacting that asset’s market prospects. For example, one’s un-
derstanding of a publicly traded firm’s stock or bond market performance gen-
erally depends on the market for that firm’s products and services as well as on 
217. See generally, Serkan Imisiker & Bedri Kamil Onur Tas, Wash Trades as a Stock Market 
Manipulation Tool, 20 J. BEHAV. & EXPERIMENTAL FIN. 92, 92–98 (2018).
218. See, e.g., Franklin Allen, Lubomir Litov & Jianping Mei, Large Investors, Price Ma-
nipulation, and Limits to Arbitrage: An Anatomy of Market Corners
10 REV. FIN. 645, 645–693 (2006).
219. Of course, after-hours trading and 24/7 trading platforms attenuate this manipulative 
device’s effectiveness somewhat.
220. As was demonstrated in the GameStop/RobinHood controversy, the SEC has insufficient 
manipulation enforcement tools. See generally Thomas Franck, ‘You’ve Got To Have A Cop On The 
Beat’: Elizabeth Warren Slams SEC Over Gamestop Chaos, CNBC (Jan. 28 2021, 3:36 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/28/elizabeth-warren-gamestop-robinhood-market-
manipulation.html (“Sen. Elizabeth Warren lambasted the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion . . . . ‘We need an SEC that has clear rules about market manipulation and then has the back-
bone to get in and enforce those rules,’ Warren said.”). This Article’s RegTech predictive regulation 
model might be useful in better addressing such RegLag issues.
221. See, e.g., Annelise Riles, Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach,
47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 63 (2014).
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the firm’s competitive environment in those product or service markets. “Ma-
nipulability” of commodities has additional complexity because there can be 
additional layers that complicate commodities market manipulation.222 Regula-
tor monitoring of social media (SM) is one source of early warning system leads 
about manipulation.223 Moreover, SM monitoring by regulators can provide 
circumstantial evidence and investigatory leads to uncover manipulatory 
schemes. For example, in January 2021, day traders created “short squeezes”
by arguably taking on and confronting hedge funds that were allegedly engag-
ing in active shorting. Additionally, some of the shorts allegedly pressured 
market intermediaries to attenuate the day traders’ bull riding of several failing 
stocks.224 However, to accomplish comprehensive, real-time, all-transaction 
surveillance, regulators must access instantaneous, direct feeds. Furthermore, 
off-exchange trading must not be in high enough volumes nor receive immedi-
ate, high-visibility transaction reporting.225 Additionally, the taking of the mar-
ket’s pulse to determine attitudes of traders can enhance a RegTech approach to 
supplying big data to AI algorithms226 that identify trading anomalies closely 
associated with known and evolving patterns of market manipulation.227
VIX is the ticker symbol for an index with no underlying asset that repre-
sents a measurement of volatility, a condition over which analysts and traders 
continually seek greater understanding. VIX is the popular name for the Chica-
go Board Options Exchange’s CBOE Volatility Index, probably the most popu-
lar measure of volatility. The VIX is based on the volatility of S&P 500 index 
options.228 A whistleblower alleged that large traders exploited a flaw in the 
calculation of the VIX, effectively manipulating the VIX when they posted fic-
titious transaction quotes. An antitrust class action was filed in the Northern 
222. See, e.g., Neal Rasmussen, From Precision Agriculture to Market Manipulation: A New 
Frontier in the Legal Community, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 489 (2016) (arguing precision agri-
culture that comprehensively constitutes a big data catalog of land quality and growing conditions 
would inform commodities market manipulators); Michael E. Sykuta, Big Data in Agriculture: 
Property Rights, Privacy and Competition in Ag Data Services, 19 INT’L. FOOD & AGRIBUS. MGMT
REV. 57 (2016) (arguing to diminish privacy rights to enhance commodities market transparency).
223. See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Market Manipulation, 66 EMORY L.J. 1253 (2016).
224. See generally Russell Hotten, Gamestop: ‘Failing’ Firm Soars in Value As Amateurs 
Buy Stock, BBC NEWS (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-55817918.
225. Junjie Wang, Shuigeng Zhou & Jihong Guan, Detecting Potential Collusive Cliques in 
Futures Markets Based on Trading Behaviors from Real Data, 92 NEUROCOMPUTING 44 (2012) 
(modeling method to analyze events by calculating a correlation coefficient matrix over all eligible 
unified aggregated time series to construct weighted graphs that detect collusive cliques colluding to 
manipulate future markets).
226. See Jia Zhai, Yi Cao & Xuemei Ding, Data Analytic Approach for Manipulation Detec-
tion in Stock Market, 50 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 897 (2018).
227. See, e.g., Koosha Golmohammadi & Osmar R. Zaiane, Sentiment Analysis on Twitter to 
Improve Time Series Contextual Anomaly Detection for Detecting Stock Market Manipulation, BIG
DATA ANALY. & KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY 327.
228. Lorraine Bailey, Judge Tosses Claims of Wall Street ‘Fear Index’ Manipulation,
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (May 30, 2019).
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District of Illinois. Although the antitrust complaint was dismissed,229 the VIX 
manipulation scheme could signal how regulators might use big data analytics 
in the future to prospect for anomalies, perhaps preventing further harms.
While no FINRA findings are yet available, the CBOE filed for SRO rule 
changes at the SEC to modify its opening processes that the CBOE argues 
might diminish VIX manipulability.230
4. Comprehensive & Real-Time, Direct Trading Feeds
Consider this section as proposing a straw man extension of the RegTech 
sandbox concept.231 New FinTechs, RegTechs or innovation in almost any field 
can be highly disruptive to the status quo. Stealth deployment chronically im-
poses negative externalities that cause varying degrees of harm. By contrast, 
regulatory agencies authorized to address emerging innovations ex ante, are in 
much better positions to anticipate harms, successes, and the resulting shifts in 
industry practices. Advocates of sandbox experimentation, which the FCA was 
the first to pioneer in June 2016,232 suggest that (i) legislators should authorize 
this framework, (ii) regulators should implement such authority by conducting 
highly isolated and controlled experiments, and (iii) regulated entities should 
test FinTech innovative tools and products, as well as RegTech methods. Well-
conceived sandboxes isolate prototype RegTech and FinTech experimentation 
so there is minimal harm externalized to markets, regulatory program efficacy 
and society generally. Analysis of resulting behaviors from these experimental 
instruments, platforms and RegTech methods give early warning. Sandboxes 
can identify the successful designs, as well as the harmful side effects of this 
research with increased disclosure and supervision, in real time, thereby inform-
ing the refinement, phased-introduction and ultimate real-world deployment.
Financial market regulation has generally followed a pattern. Initially the 
market develops without much oversight under laissez-faire conditions. Then 
229. In re Chi. Bd. Options Exch. Volatility Index Manipulation Antitrust Litig., 390 F. Supp. 
3d 916 (N.D. Ill. 2019), http://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/cboe-
vix.pdf.
230. Self-Regulatory Organizations; CBOE Exchange, Inc; Notice of Filing of a Proposed 
Rule Change to Amend the Exchange’s Opening Process Including on VIX Settlement Days, SEC 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-86387, 84 Fed. Reg. 35147 (proposed July 16, 2019).
231. See, e.g., DOUGLAS W. ARNER, JÀNOS BARBERIS & ROSS P. BUCKLEY, FINTECH AND 
REGTECH IN A NUTSHELL, AND THE FUTURE IN A SANDBOX 16–18 (CFA Inst. Res. Foun. ed., 
2017); Douglas W. Arner, Janos Barberis & Ross P. Buckey, Fintech, Regtech, And The Reconcep-
tualization of Financial Regulation, 37 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 371, 408–11 (2017); Michael M. 
Piri, The Changing Landscapes of FinTech and RegTech: Why the United States Should Create a 
Federal Regulatory Sandbox, 2 BUS. & FIN. L. REV. 233, 246–49 (2019); Dirk A. Zetzsche, and 
Zetzsche, Dirk A., Ross P. Buckley, Janos N. Barberis & Douglas W. Arner, Regulating a Revolu-
tion: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart Regulation, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, 64 
(2017).
232. See Regulatory Sandbox, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Nov. 5, 2015),
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox.
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regulations may follow if a public policy debate over the market innovation 
triggers perception that there are abuses or markets failures. Financial market 
regulation laws and self-regulatory standards have been imposed throughout the 
world predominately in this second step. Such laws have focused on transparen-
cy. A smaller, but significant subset of substantive regulations is also noted.233
Transparency typically invades individual privacy and institutional confi-
dentiality. Justifications for such intrusions are typically offered as a balance 
favoring societal goals of market integrity, efficiency, and liquidity. The effec-
tiveness of public policies requiring transparency is commonly evaluated with 
ex post, cost-benefit, and risk-benefit analyses.234 These appraisals focus on the 
aggregate costs of individual and institutional privacy deprivation (proprietary 
loss, competitive strategic revelation) as set against systemic vitality. Any bal-
ance reached, however, must include some intrusions because as Merritt Fox 
has described, in disclosure regimes that are completely voluntary, companies 
will probably disclose a suboptimal amount of proprietary data concerning their 
businesses and their operation models, because the disclosing companies will be 
unable to capture the major value that such disclosures provide to their competi-
tors.235 This is particularly the case when disclosing proprietary data could re-
sult in a disclosing company losing its competitive advantage.236 But, enforcing 
stricter and broader disclosure requirements means adding significant costs to 
the disclosing companies, and a full examination of the normative case for en-
hanced disclosure probably mandates a more detailed and carefully tailored 
cost-benefit analysis.237 Thus, while there are clearly benefits to an enhanced 
disclosure regime, such benefits require a careful examination.
233. E.g., capital requirements, proxy process regulation, transaction standardization, prohib-
ited transactions, prohibited manipulation, market intermediary structure and professionalism, and 
the licensing of exchanges and transaction processes.
234. The problem, however, is that in many cases, agencies’ cost benefit analyses lack basic 
process visibility, which means that the analyses themselves and their role in the decision-making 
process is not an evident or obvious one. Moreover, most cost benefit analyses lack visibility in 
terms of the related policy impacts, as it is common for analyses to not quantify or monetize the 
examined costs and benefits. See Caroline Cecot & Robert W. Hahn, Transparency in Agency Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 72 ADMIN. L. REV. 157, 158 (2020).
235. Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not 
Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1339, 1345–46 (1999).
236. Robert P. Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of Deriva-
tive Disclosures During the Financial Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 1, 57 (2010) (citing Michael D. Gut-
tentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure Requirements on Public Companies, FLA ST. U. L.
REV. 123, 147 (2004)) (using AIG as an example describing how “these considerations might deter a 
firm from voluntarily disclosing its derivative positions was clearly illustrated in the refusal of AIG 
and the New York Federal Reserve to disclose details about AIG’s portfolio of insured CDOs until a 
member of Congress released the information to the media after a heated Congressional investiga-
tion into the lack of transparency surrounding AIG’s rescue.”).
237. Cf. Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387, 432–33 (2001).
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5. Dodd-Frank Reforms Enable RegTech Compliance
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank)238 was intended to continue this balance between transparency and sub-
stantive regulation, generally favoring the former,239 but with a few instances of 
favoring the latter.240 For example, some controversial substantive provisions 
are regulations prohibiting certain practices identified from the 2008 financial 
crisis as imposing unacceptable levels of systemic risk.241 Integral to the prob-
lem is the distinction between ex-ante and ex-post transaction transparency.
The latter is de rigueur following criminal prosecution, enforcement by gov-
ernment regulatory agencies and self-regulatory organizations, and civil damage 
lawsuits under private rights of action. That is, investigations, subpoenaed rec-
ords, and pre-trial discovery produce almost comprehensive transaction records 
that reveal high granularity in past trades by all individuals and institutions sus-
pected of involvement.242
By contrast, ex-ante transparency can enhance anticipatory RegTech ef-
forts.243 This approach is not traditionally deployed to reveal nascent systemic 
risks. As a result, ex-ante data mining and network science analysis are argued 
here to hold promise for the anticipation and detection of risky positions, identi-
238. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
239. For instance, a regulation regarding approximately $110 billion dollars that get sent eve-
ry year from individuals in the U.S. to other countries in remittances. See Michael J. Lorden, Dodd-
Frank 1073: Creating the Well-Informed Remittance Consumer, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 266, 
283 (2013). The regulation, which is known as Dodd-Frank 1073, went into effect on February 7, 
2013, with a goal to increase transparency for consumers, and that was met with much criticism 
from the banking community. Id. at 268. The regulation is meant to create a “comprehensive new 
system of consumer protections for remittance transfers” and “provide consumers with better infor-
mation for comparison shopping.” Id. at 270.
240. See, e.g., Digital Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 773 (2018) (“Passed in the 
wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Dodd–Frank aimed to “promote the financial stability of the Unit-
ed States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system.”)
241. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111–203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (the Volcker Rule bans commercial banks from using cus-
tomer deposits for their own profit).
242. Of course, some private trades may remain opaque. For the purposes of this exemplar, 
these over-the-counter (OTC) trades are ignored. However, there may still be situations where the 
size of these transactions, the concerted efforts at maintaining their opacity and the influential posi-
tions of the counter-parties may render them material.
243. Somewhat similarly, most scholars have advocated for an ex-ante approach in connec-
tion with enhancing transparency and oversight as well as “increased disclosure from the black box 
of the credit rating agencies’ ratings process” as was eventually required in the Dodd-Frank itself 
(although in vaguer terms). E.g., David A. Skeel, Jr. et al., Inside-Out Corporate Governance, 37 J.
CORP. L. 147, 176–77 (2011) (explaining some scholars argue “that CRAs should be forced to dis-
close to the public all rating agency actions, including all initial ratings proposals, downgrades, up-
grades, placements on watch, and removal of ratings, in addition to unsolicited ratings and subscrib-
er-paid ratings . . . [and while some] worry that mandatory disclosure of all actions would 
undermine the business model of ratings agencies, the potential benefits of disclosure in significant-
ly reshaping the issuer-CRA relationship seem too great to forgo.”).
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fication of concentrated relationships or isolation of centrality in transaction 
networks. Indeed, ex-ante disclosure has generally been quite limited—
reserved for aggregated financial condition data and extraordinary events, but 
without revealing such fine-grained detail.
Dodd-Frank could have been implemented to change this model. This 
change could have enabled ex-ante risk discovery that might facilitate risk min-
imization, as focused through regulators, and as implemented by market partici-
pants and intermediaries; the classic RegTech compliance solution. To achieve 
this systemic risk control, Dodd-Frank created some new regulatory programs 
and at least three new supervising agencies, including the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC), the Treasury Department’s Office of Financial Re-
search, and the CFPB. The Dodd-Frank authorizes these agencies to ex-ante 
gather “position” information that as suggested could reveal systemic financial 
market risks using network analysis of large data sets of transactions, in both 
the consumer and financial institution markets.244
The direct and indirect costs of transparency inherent in the Dodd-Frank’s
new institutional structure would have resulted from ex-ante transaction disclo-
sures. First, federal regulatory agencies and their regulatory mechanisms could 
have been designed to add monitoring programs that balance the privacy and 
confidentiality risks of Dodd-Frank programs against the prevention of market 
collapse. Second, anticipated reactions to transparency regulations by financial 
market participants might have resulted in offshoring of domestically executed 
transactions or in the relocation of positions into nations or markets with less 
intrusive scrutiny of private financial transactions. Thus, the traditional argu-
ment that overly strict (transparency) regulations incentivize regulatory arbi-
trage could have been counteracted with regulatory response. That reaction 
could have attempted to enhance inter-market, international regulatory coordi-
nation harmonizing systemic risk regulation among all nations with prospective 
market or trading platform potential. This would leave no haven as refuge.
Third, ex-ante transparency risks for comprehensive transaction data must be 
assessed by regulators. For example, there may be unintended consequences of 
real-time data feeds monitoring confidential transaction logs of traditional fi-
nancial intermediaries, requiring standardized instruments, or requiring central-
ized and transparent clearing mechanisms.
244. E.g., Daniel J. Hunt, Just Grin and Bear It: Why Consistent Use of Individual Bailouts 
Under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act Is A Necessary Evil to Combat Economic “Mass 
Destruction’, 6 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 59, 87 (2014) (“Composed of high-level government 
leaders including the Secretary of Treasury and the Chairman of the Fed, the FSOC incorporates 
Congress’s “preference for ex-ante solutions to systemic risk concerns . . . . Ultimately, the FSOC 
aims to establish “ex-ante” approaches to preventing and containing systemic risk”).
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6. Satisficing Opposition to Comprehensive Data Feeds 
Strong opposition to ex-ante, real-time, sensor systems should be anticipat-
ed if regulation results in heretofore unavailable transparency or analysis of 
market makers, regular scrutiny of the specialists’ “book,” or forced sunlight 
into dark pools using network science analysis.  Opponents can be expected to 
argue that transparency would reveal proprietary trading strategies needed to 
attract participants who supply needed market liquidity.245  Furthermore, trans-
parency can be expected to incentivize regulatory enforcement and private liti-
gation.  Finally, transparency can be anticipated to breed substantive market 
mechanism regulation.  Examples might include additional circuit breakers, or 
other early warnings at the approach thresholds of trading measures, the manda-
tory unwinding of positions as they surpass standard risk profiles, and structural 
reforms that could adjust the architecture of the financial system. 
To attenuate intrusion risks, regulatory agencies can temper comprehensive 
big data collection requirements that reveal the whole portfolio of transactions 
by every market participant.  For example, sampling techniques might be adopt-
ed rather than requiring comprehensive intrusions.  As to confining the public-
visibility of transaction transparency, there are numerous middle-ground ap-
proaches possible.  For example, the self-evaluation privilege could be adapted 
to shield data held by third party risk management consulting firms.246  This re-
intermediation could be in SRO form if not “housed” in government controlled 
or related agencies.  FOIA exceptions could be adapted to protect some aspects 
of this data, such as be delaying real-time disclosure and/or anonymizing coun-
ter-party identities.  Trading strategy confidentiality and trading partner privacy 
could be maintained absent privileged access to the full transaction data when it 
becomes necessary for robust systemic financial risk analysis or litigation. 
With strong incentives for such analysis and widespread perception that 
these benefits regularly outweigh the costs, markets could conceivably develop 
for systemic risk assessment by independent systemic analysis service organiza-
tions (SASO).  Pressures can be expected to adapt traditional business and ana-
lytical models used by the ratings agencies to improve SASO performance and 
identify any conflicts of interest for reduction.  Especially, if it can help busi-
nesses avert public embarrassment or even consumer backlash.247  Some stand-
 
 245. See, e.g., John W. Bagby, Big Data as Efficient National Market System Enabler: Dodd-
Frank Balances Systemic Risk with Privacy & Confidentiality, Univ. Indianapolis (Apr. 8, 2016). 
 246. See. e.g., Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.C. 1970) (implying a self-
evaluation privilege); Nancy C. Crisman, & Arthur F. Mathews, Limited Waiver of Attorney-Client 
Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine in Internal Corporate Investigations: An Emerging Corpo-
rate Self-Evaluation Privilege, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 123 (1983); John W. Bagby, Paula C. Murray, 
& Eric T. Andrews, How Green Was My Balance Sheet: Corporate Liability and Environmental 
Disclosure, 14 VA. ENV’TL. L. J. 225–342 (Winter 1995) (discussing statutory self-evaluation privi-
lege); but see James Cox, Case against a Judicially Created, Common-Law Self-Audit or Self-
Evaluation Privilege Applicable to Environmental Cases, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
 247. See Jules Polonetsky, Omer Tene & Joseph Jerome, Beyond the Common Rule: Ethical 
Structures for Data Research in Non-Academic Settings, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 333, 338 (2015). 
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ardization and validation of systemic financial risk analytics can be expected to 
attract such analytics in-house to firms in the financial services industry. This 
development could further reduce costs, enhance analysis, and thereby permit 
regular analysis to yield useful signals that enable risk reduction remediation at 
significantly lower transparency risk.
V. WHAT ARE SOME LOGICAL NEXT STEPS?
This Article sheds some light on how RegTech could inspire political oppo-
sition resulting in litigation challenges. Libertarian arguments that view Reg-
Tech as intrusive stealth re-regulation raise issues likely foundational to that 
ideology. Privacy and confidentiality deprivations are likely among RegTech 
methods that should channel careful RegTech design. Indeed, government 
transparency (FOIA) must be balanced with regulatory goals. Consider how 
pathogen containment strategies deploying track and trace protocols (e.g., 
COVID 19) are a logical corollary to Smart City design. Test, track, and trace 
(T3) will surely degrade privacy in exchange for promises of more effective 
contagion vector provenance and disease transmission forensics.248 Will such 
privacy intrusions survive the (hopefully) inevitable COVID 19 decline? If pri-
vacy is surely dying perhaps some “post-9/11-style” cataclysm-induced privacy 
intrusions will need to be periodically reconsidered and reauthorized.249 Next,
RegTech advocates promise cost saving and robust efficacy benefits.250 How-
ever, regulated entities must likely invest substantially to make RegTech suc-
cessful. Therefore, higher costs for RegTech ultimately seem likely, at least 
during startup. These higher initiation and maintenance costs will likely be 
shared by both regulators, regulated entities, and their customers.251
RegTech’s expected costs must be explored to achieve balance against pre-
dictable societal benefits. Researchers should explore the obvious initial hy-
Moreover, in such cases businesses must also “employ ethical review processes and instill issue-
spotting skills in employees throughout the organization.” Id.
248. See Sangchul Park, Gina Jeehyun Choi & Haksoo Ko, Information technology–based 
tracing strategy in response to COVID-19 in South Korea—privacy controversies, JAMA 
NETWORK (Apr. 23, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2765252; Leesa Lin 
& Zhiyuan Hou, Combat COVID-19 with Artificial Intelligence and Big Data, J. TRAVEL MED. 1, 
5–6 (2020).
249. See, e.g., Peter Margulies, Reauthorizing the FISA Amendments Act: A Blueprint for En-
hancing Privacy Protections and Preserving Foreign Intelligence Capabilities, 12 J. BUS. & TECH.
L. 23 (2016).
250. At least some attention focuses on the effectiveness of RegTech. See, e.g., Amélie Lab-
bé, Why Regtech Must be Regulated, INT’L. FIN. L. REV. (Nov. 10, 2017) 
https://www.iflr.com/Article/3766183/Why-regtech-must-be-regulated.html.
251. See generally, John W. Bagby, Regulatory Impact Analyses: Towards a Reasonable 
Economic Impact from Federal Regulations, 19 NEW ENG. L. REV. 533 (1984) (arguing Presidential 
imposition of cost-benefit analyses to justify new major rules further opens opportunities for presi-
dential administration imposition of political judgments by dominating agency independence and 
agency staff inspired interpretation of statutory missions).
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potheses that RegTech cost imposition will shift to regulated entities, forcing 
the latter to behave differently. Any resulting cost savings from electronic mon-
itoring must be balanced with loss of privacy and confidentiality. From the 
regulator perspective, the chronic lag in deploying computer and tele-
communications technologies to sustain their statutory missions makes many 
new RegTech capabilities unattainable. In order to maintain regulatory agency 
functionality during (seemingly perpetual) periods of budget pressure, regula-
tors must consider that initial cost increases must be balanced with long-term 
cost containment. This is a long-term investment perspective common in the 
private sector but increasingly necessary to maintain regulatory missions. The 
regulator vs. regulated entity relationship could evolve to symbiotic but likely 
retains the cat and mouse game, arms race that characterizes most of history.
RegTech may obviate deregulation if it is done right. RegTech makes for a 
fiercer government beast because regulatory methods are mechanized on both 
sides, allowing force reduction, cost savings, and regulated entity’s touting of 
faithful compliance. Consider how RegTech may have enabled enhanced regu-
lation in the post COVID 19 homework/tele-commuting adaptation revolution.
RegTech is likely to exhibit all the cyber security difficulties already plaguing 
electronic commerce: online sales, financial services, banking, trading, etc.
RegTech may be also depend on intermediaries’ risk.252 Third party service 
providers bring problems that include the IP of these service providers’ methods 
and data; the licensing costs and restrictions of using others’ data and algo-
rithms; the need to deal with the challenges associated with where many third 
parties are situated, which is beyond serviceable jurisdictions; the issues associ-
ated with ISP, IaaS, and SaaS providers that impose liability waivers in their 
service level agreements (SLA); the administration of service level management 
(SLM); and metrics that can be daunting. Additionally, restrictive contractual 
terms, like non-disclosure agreements (NDA), lock-in provisions, and non-
competes make RegTech solutions complex to manage.
CONCLUSION
RegTech shows great promise in narrowing the RegLag gap. RegTech pro-
grams can improve regulatory agency clairvoyance and help regulators to adapt 
more aggressively to changing regulable activities, such as by using anticipatory 
approaches. But any such transformation will remain elusive in the near to me-
dium future for various reasons, including the technology diffusion lag. Oppo-
sition at nearly every turn should be anticipated if RegTech is to become as ef-
fective as hoped. Sub rosa undermining regulatory agencies by de-regulatory 
252. See e.g. David England, COVID-19 Puts Third-Party Risk Management Under a Micro-
scope, Corporate Compliance Insight (June 18, 2020) https://www.corporatecompliance
insights.com/covid-19-third-party-risk-management/; Why You Should Pay Attention To Regtech & 
Third-Party Risks, The Risk Management Association, (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.rmahq.org
/why-you-should-pay-attention-to-regtech-and-third-party-risks/.
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ideological forces will undercut RegTech’s promise. Considerable expense will 
be needed initially and over time for IT hardware, training, specialized consult-
ing, bulk data, and third-party service providers both for regulators and regulat-
ed entities. New procurement expertise will often be needed, particularly for 
regulatory agencies. Perhaps centralized procurement and adaptation will be 
needed for state agencies and for federal agencies. Some centralized, coordinat-
ing agency with technical expertise is needed, but it cannot be one that is very 
politicized or Presidential administration dependent, such as the OMB,253 or 
what the CFPB might become after Seila, as the case’s biggest result will prob-
ably be having every elected president likely appointing a new bureau direc-
tor.254 Therefore, based on these criteria, in some respects, the General Services 
Administration (GSA) and NIST might be appropriate. Likewise, there needs to 
be an independent inspector general (OIG) that assesses RegTech’s efficacy and 
efficiency, even if the potential agency which will do such assessments appears 
as non-existent in the current political environment.255
253. See, e.g., John W. Bagby, Thwarting Malicious Assaults on Democracy: A Compelling 
Role for Big Data Analytics (Apr. 28, 2018) (submitted by author at Big Data Workshop, Babson 
College, Wellesley, MA), https://ssrn. Com/abstract=3299620 (explaining the centrality of OMB in 
regulatory reform, but also why it suffers from extreme political influence from the Presidential 
administration).
254. See Nizan Geslevich Packin, Show Me the Data (About the) Money!, UTAH L. REV.
1277, 1292 (2021).
255. See, e.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical In-
vestigation, 70 UNIV. CHIC. L. REV. 821–885 (2003) (discussing how the OMB exerts strong agency 
discipline, especially in significant deregulatory periods such as under Reagan’s administrations).

